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Abstract 
 
Japan’s response to September 11, consisting of the enactment of an anti-terrorism law and 
the despatch of the SDF to the Indian Ocean in support of the US and other concerned states, 
has generated an intense debate on the future of its regional and global security role. For 
those opposed to the remilitarisation of Japanese security policy, SDF despatch is questioned 
on grounds of its constitutionality, the wisdom of using force for responding to terrorist 
phenomena, and as leading to the further integration of Japan into US global military 
strategy. For those that are desirous of the ‘normalisation’ of Japanese security policy, GOJ 
actions have been applauded as avoiding the ‘Gulf War syndrome’ and an important step 
towards Japan contributing to coalition actions for international stability. Opinions are also 
mixed on the implications of Japan’s actions for the overall future trajectory of its security 
policy. On the one hand, Japan’s participation in the campaign is seem to confirm the 
traditional incremental expansion of its military security role—the anti-terrorism law 
predicated on UN resolutions, limited in time, and avoiding an overt breach of the prohibition 
on the exercise of collective self defence. On the other, Japan’s actions are seen as a marking 
a watershed in its security policy, as they create a precedent for future operations in support 
of the US in the bilateral context of the US-Japan alliance, and de facto exercise of collective 
self defence which will lead eventually to its de jure recognition. 
 
The objective of this working paper is to analyse and evaluate in detail these debates on the 
future of Japanese security policy. It argues that Japan’s security policy is likely to proceed 
along a path which falls in between the two extreme scenarios outlined above. The events of 
September 11 were an extreme confluence of circumstances, and Japan has undoubtedly built 
into its reaction to September 11 a number of opt-out clauses that ensure it can return to the 
path incrementalism. But Japan has also indeed set a precedent for its security policy which 
could lead to the transfer of the principles of the anti-terrorism law to the US-Japan alliance, 
and has opened up new avenues for the exercise of collective security and cooperation with 
the UN, creating potentially radical effects for its security policy over the longer term.The 
study examines the issues of the trajectory of Japan’s individual, bilateral alliance and 
multilateral security policy; the dynamics of the US-Japan alliance; the motivations of the 
key Japanese and US political, bureaucratic and military actors; the shifting policy-making 
structure in Japan; the reaction of East Asian states to Japan’s actions; and theoretical 
questions concerned with alliance politics, and security policy-making.  
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Introduction: Japan’s speedy and substantial response 
 
In response to the September 11 attacks on the US, Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirō at 
0:50am Japan time on the morning of September 12  issued an official condemnation of the 
terrorist incidents.1 Koizumi later the same morning at 10:00am convened the Japanese 
government's National Security Council (NSC). The NSC reiterated the Government of 
Japan’s (GOJ) position that the incidents represented an attack not only upon the US but also 
the rest of the democratic world, and adopted a six-point policy response stressing Japan’s 
intention to cooperate with the US and other concerned states in order to combat international 
terrorism.2 On September 19, the GOJ then issued its Basic Policy and list of seven 
immediate measures in response to the simultaneous attacks (dōji tahatsu tero) on the US, 
including the despatch of the Japan Self Defence Forces (JSDF) to provide support for US 
and other forces in actions against terrorism. Following these announcements, on 5 October 
the GOJ submitted to the Diet an Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law (Tero Taisaku 
Tokubestu Sochi Hōan) and revisions to the Self Defence Forces Law in order to supplement 
existing legislation and to enable the SDF to undertake a range of activities in support of 
operations against terrorism.3 The bill passed the House of Representatives lower chamber on 
16 October, and then passed the House of Councillors upper chamber and entered into law on 
29 October. On 9 November, three Maritime Self Defence Force (MSDF) ships departed 
from Sasebo for the Indian Ocean to engage in ‘information gathering’ activities. On 16 
November,  the GOJ announced its Basic Plan of action based on the Anti-Terrorism Special 
Measures Law, and ordered the despatch on 25 November of a second flotilla of three MSDF 
transport and destroyers.4 These six MSDF ships, in combination with six Air Self Defence 
                                                 
1 Prime Minister’s Office, ‘Statement by the Prime Minister of Japan’, 12 September 2001, 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumispeech/2001/0911seimei_e1.html. 
2 Prime Minister’s Office, ‘Government Response Policy Adopted by the National Security Council’, 12 
September 2001, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/saigai/terojiken/taisyo_e.html. 
3 The full name of law in Japanese is: Heisei Jūsannen Kugatsu Jūichinichi no America Gashūkoku ni oite 
Hassei shita Terorisuto ni yoru Kōgeki nado ni Taiō shite Okanawareru Kokusai Rengō Kenshō no Mokuteki no 
Shogaikoku no Katsudō ni taishite Waga Kuni ga Jisshi suru Sochi oyobi Kanren suru Kokusai Rengō Ketsugi 
nado ni Motozuku Jindōteki Sochi ni Kansuru Tokubetsu Sochihō. The official English translation is: The 
Special Measures Law Concerning Measures Taken by Japan in Support of the Activities of Foreign Countries 
Aiming to Achieve the Purposes of the Charter of the United Nations in Response to the Terrorist Attacks 
Which Took Place on 11 September 2001 in the United States of America as well as Concerning Humanitarian 
Measures Based on Relevant Resolutions of the United Nations. 
4 The first flotilla of the fuel supply ship Hamana (Towada-class, 8,100-ton), and destroyers Kurama (Shirane-
class, 5,200-ton) and Kirisame (Harusame-class, 4,550-ton) were originally despatched under Clause 18 Article 
5 of the Defence Agency Establishment Law of 1954 which allows the GOJ to carry out  'necessary 
investigation and research for the conduct of operations' (shoshō jimu no tsuikō ni hitsyō na chōsa oyobi 
kenkyū). Despite the enactment of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law in late October, the GOJ was still 
engaged in deliberations over the exact content of the Basic Plan, and thus decided to utilise the Defency 
Agency Law to ensure the earliest possible despatch of the MSDF to the geographically distant Indian Ocean 
and then to enlarge the scope of these ships activities in an ex post facto fashion by including their activities 
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Force (ASDF) transport aircraft, were charged with the mission of providing refuelling and 
logistical transport, medical and maintenance support to US and other forces in the Indian 
Ocean and Arabian Sea. The SDF’s range of action was defined as including not just the sea 
and airspace of the Indian Ocean itself, but in addition that of the states located along the 
coast of the Indian Ocean and the supply lines stretching back to Japan, Australia and the US. 
 
Most seasoned observers of Japan expect to see a pattern of international and regional crises 
precipitating changes in its security policy, but few envisaged the remarkable sequence of 
Japanese actions outlined above in the wake of September 11. During the Gulf War of 1990-
91, the perceived failure to respond to US and international demands for a ‘human 
contribution’ re-launched a fierce domestic debate on Japan’s post-Cold War security role, 
leading to an abortive attempt to pass in the Diet a UN Peace Cooperation Corps Bill in 
October 1990 and eventually the despatch of MSDF minesweepers to the Persian Gulf in 
after the cessation of hostilities. The final outcome of the international and domestic crisis 
generated by the Gulf War was to provide political momentum for the enactment of the 
International Peace Cooperation Law in June 1992, which has enabled the subsequent 
despatch of the SDF on UN Peacekeeping Operation (PKO) missions to Cambodia, Angola, 
Mozambique, the Golan Heights, El Salvador, and East Timor. 5 Similarly, the North Korean 
nuclear crisis of 1994 indicated the fundamental lack of political and military confidence in 
the ability of the US-Japan alliance to respond to regional contingencies, and forced a process 
of the ‘reconfirmation’ (saikakunin) or  ‘redefinition’ (saiteigi) of the alliance. This process, 
also set against the backdrop of the Taiwan Straits crisis of March 1996, culminated in the 
                                                                                                                                                        
within the Basic Plan and under the new law. The second flotilla of the fuel supply ship Towada (Towada-class, 
8,100-ton), minesweeper tender Uraga (Uraga-class, 5,650-ton), and the destroyer Sawagiri (Asagiri-class, 
3,550-ton) was despatched under the new law. The total deployment of MSDF personnel was set at a limit of 
1,200 men , and 2,400 men when a change of units was rotated in. The initial period of operations for the 
operation was until 19 May 2002, but then extended by the GOJ for a further six months after this date. After 
arriving on station in the Arabian Sea from early December 2001, the MSDF ships have provided fuel oil and 
supplies to US ships, refuelled one UK ship on 29 January. The Uraga delivered humanitarian relief supplies to 
Karachi port in Pakistan on 12 December, before returning to Japan on 31 December. The GOJ despatched a 
third flotilla on 12 and 13 February to relieve its first flotilla, consisting of the fuel supply ship Tokiwa 
(Towada-class, 8,150-ton), and the destroyers Sawakaze (Tachikaze-class, 3,950-ton) and Haruna (Haruna-
class, 4,950-ton). The first flotilla returned to Japan on March 16. The Towada and Sawagiri from the second 
flotilla returned to Japan on 26 April 2002. The ASDF began to transport supplies using C-130H aircraft to US 
forces in Japan and elsewhere under the anti-terrorism law on 29 November 2001, although it had already been 
engaged since October 7 in transporting humanitarian relief to Pakistan under the United Nations Peacekeeping 
Operations Law of 1992.  
5 On SDF despatch to the Gulf and PKO operations and the effect on Japanese security policy debates, see 
Glenn D. Hook, Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan, Routledge, London, pp. 86-90; 
Yamaguchi Jiro, ‘The Gulf War and the transformation of Japanese constitutional politics’, Journal of Japanese 
Studies, vol. 18, no. 1., Winter 1992, pp. 155-172; Inoguchi Takashi, ‘Japan’s response to the Gulf crisis: an 
analytic overview’, Journal of Japanese Studies, vol. 17, no. 2, Summer, 1991, pp. 257-273; Aurelia George, 
‘Japan’s participation in UN peacekeeping operations: radical departure or predictable response? Asian Survey, 
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US-Japan Joint Security Declaration of April 1996, and the announcement of the revised 
Guidelines for Japan-US Defence Coopearation in September 1997.6 The final stage of this 
process of filling in the gaps in operability of the US-Japan alliance was the passage through 
the Diet in May 1999 of the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of 
Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan (Shūhen Jitai ni Saishite Waga Kuni no 
Heiwa oyobi Anzen o Kakuho suru tame no Socchi ni Kansuru Hōritsu, or abbreviated to 
Shūhen Jitaihō), which enabled the SDF to provide logistic support to US forces in order to 
defend Japan in the event of regional contingencies around its periphery (shūhen) 
Nonetheless, even given this track record of external crisis and incremental expansions in 
Japanese security policy, many Japan watchers—not only foreign, but also domestic—were 
taken aback at both the speed and the substance of the Japanese reaction to events.  
 
Although the speed of Japan’s response has still been subject to domestic and international 
criticism, even the most basic knowledge of the cautious pace of Japanese security policy-
making debates and legislation in the post-Cold War period (and indeed Cold War period) 
indicates that the enactment of the anti-terrorism law was lightening swift.7 Compared to the 
tempestuous Diet debates on the International Peace Cooperation Law which took nine 
months, and the tortuous definitional debates on the geographical and functional scope of the 
Shūhen Jitaihō which took close to one year, the passage of the new law was smooth and 
rapid, requiring less than three weeks and thirty three hours of debate to pass both houses of 
the Diet.  
 
Just as importantly, the contents of the anti-terrorism law and the subsequent activities of the 
SDF activities have been seen to represent a potential major expansion of Japan’s military 
security role that in a number of ways goes beyond previous legal frameworks such as the 
Shūhen Jitaihō and International Peace Cooperation Law. SDF missions in the Indian Ocean 
represented a first for Japan’s military forces in that it was first time they has been despatched 
overseas during an ongoing conflict. The anti-terrorism law, although it designates limitations 
upon the geographical range of SDF logistical operations in support of the US and other 
                                                                                                                                                        
vol. 33, no. 6, June 1993, pp. 560-575; Peter J. Woolley, Japan’s Navy: Politics and Paradox 1971-2000, 
Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2000, pp. 89-130. 
6 On the North Korean nuclear crisis and the Taiwan Straits crisis and the impact on the US-Japan alliance, see 
Christopher W. Hughes, ‘The North Korean crisis and Japanese security’, Survival: The IISS Quarterly, vol. 38. 
No. 2, pp. 79-103; Thomas J. Christensen, ‘China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East 
Asia, International Security, vol. 23, no. 4, Spring 1999, pp. 49-80; Eric Heginbotham and Richard J. Samuels, 
‘Mercantile realism and Japanese foreign policy’, International Security, vol. 22, no. 4, pp. 171-203. 
7 George Wehrfritz and Hideo Takayama, ‘Bringing up the rear: an embarrassed Japan tries to join the fight’, 
Newsweek, 15 October 2001, p. 41. 
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states, at the same time provides one form of legal framework which expands the SDF’s 
geographical scope of action far beyond that of  Shūhen Jitaihō; enables new potential SDF 
missions on the land territory of states included within the geographical range of the anti-
terrorism law; and indicates that in the future, under new laws, the despatch of the SDF in 
support of US forces could become almost limitless geographically.  
 
In addition, the anti-terrorism law also appeared to many commentators inside and outside 
Japan to represent an expansion of the functional scope of SDF despatch. The anti-terrorism 
law differs from the International Peace Cooperation Law and Shūhen Jitaihō in that allows 
for the use of  weapons to protect not only the lives and bodies of individual SDF personnel 
and their units, but also those who ‘have come under their control’, which has been read as 
meaning wounded personnel from US and other forces, and refugees from the Afghan 
conflict. Moreover, this particular legal provision and indeed the entire anti-terrorism law and 
Japan’s activities in the Indian Ocean have raised questions about Japan’s adherence to its 
self-imposed ban upon the exercise of collective self defence. Japan’s provision of logistical 
support to the forces of the US and other states which themselves were operating under the 
invocation of the principles of individual and collective self defence respectively, has been 
interpreted as necessarily an de facto act of collective self defence, and thus a breach of 
Japan’s own constitutional prohibitions and a step beyond the International Peace 
Cooperation Law and Shūhen Jitaihō which were constructed with considerable care by the 
GOJ to avoid the collective self defence issue.  
 
As analysed in more detail below and following the logic of Japanese policy-makers 
themselves, it is important to distinguish the anti-terrorism law from the Shūhen Jitaihō and 
other legal frameworks, in that they are different sets of laws designed for, it is argued, 
different sets of circumstances, and hence it is also important to be wary of drawing 
precedents for Japanese security policy from the anti-terrorism law. GOJ policy-makers 
continue to hold the public position that the SDF’s geographical scope of action under the 
anti-terrorism law may not necessarily have implications for the future scope of US-Japan 
logistical cooperation under the bilateral security treaty, and that the ban on collective self 
defence remains firmly in place.  
 
Nevertheless, despite GOJ protestations concerning the essential continuity of the security 
role provided for Japan under the anti-terrorism law, internal and external commentators have 
attached considerable significance to the new legislation. Elements of the mass media and 
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academic community, along with current and former Diet members of the Social Democratic 
Party of Japan (SDPJ), which oppose Japanese remilitarisation have questioned the SDF 
despatch from a variety of perspectives, including whether it is constitutional, whether 
military force is the most appropriate response to dealing with terrorist phenomena, and 
whether the anti-terrorism law sets a dangerous precedent for further integration of Japan into 
US regional and global military strategy.8 Added to these domestic critics, the governments 
of China and South Korea, and especially in the early stages of Japan’s debate on the 
despatch of the SDF commented on the need for Japanese caution not to repeat the mistakes 
of past Japanese military endeavours. In contrast to this reaction, those in the media, 
academic and political communities that advocate a so-called more ‘normal’ role for Japan’s 
utilisation of military force in cooperation with the US and the international community in 
order to contribute to global stability have broadly welcomed the anti-terrorism law as an 
important step forward in achieving this role.9 In particular, certain sections of US opinion 
less well-informed about the history of Japanese security policy, but viewing the events of 
September 11 through a US-focussed prism, have been encouraged by what they see as 
Japan’s movement towards realising a role as the ‘Britain of the Far East’, solidly behind and 
looking to expand its support specifically for the US in its global campaign against 
terrorism.10  
 
Hence, a wide variety of commentators and policy-makers are in agreement that the anti-
terrorism law must carry some significance for the future of Japanese security, but where they 
would appear to lack a consensus is regarding exactly what type of precedent the law sets for 
its overall trajectory. For some, the new law and SDF operations represent more of a one-off 
action by Japan, which will not lead to any fundamental deviation from the traditional pattern 
of the incremental expansion of its security role both independently and in conjunction with 
the US, and which still leaves in place the constitutional and other prohibitions on the use of 
Japanese military power. Japan’s much debated and eventual abstention from the despatch of 
                                                 
8 Gavin McCormack provides one highly trenchant critique of the legality and diplomatic wisdom of Japan 
response to the terrorist attacks. Gavin McCormack, ‘Japan’s Afghan Expedition’, Japan in the World, 
http://www.iwanami.co.jp/jpworld/text/Afghanexpedition01.html. For similar criticisms of Japan’s role and 
indeed the entire international political circumstances that have led to September 11 and its aftermath, see 
Sakamoto Yoshikazu, ‘Tero no “bunmei” no seijigaku: ningen toshite dō kotaeru ka’, in Fujiwara Kiichi (ed.) 
Tero no Ato: Sekai wa Dō Kawatta Ka, Tokyo, Iwanami Shinsho, 2002, pp. 1-28. 
9 For instance, see Yukio Okamoto, ‘Japan and the United States: the essential alliance’, The Washington 
Quarterly, vol. 25, no. 2, Spring 2002, pp. 59-72. James Auer, the former Director of Japan Affairs at the 
Department of Defence, even claimed that Japan’s support for the US after September 11 would be an 
opportunity to make amends for Pearl Harbour. James E. Auer, ‘Japan’s chance to reverse Pearl Harbor’, 
http://www.glocomnet.or.jp/okazaki-inst/pearlhauer.html. 
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its most advanced Aegis Weapon System (AWS)-equipped destroyers as part of the MSDF 
flotilla to the Indian Ocean is seen as one indication of its ultra-caution about committing 
military forces to overseas operations. For others, Japan’s recent actions represent a major 
incremental leap in its security policy that could take it to the point of no return in terms of 
breaking with its past traditions.11 This is because, even though the anti-terrorism law has not 
challenged directly many of the constitutional prohibitions on the SDF per se, it has 
established de facto precedents of cooperation with the US and other states in the case of the 
global war on terrorism which mean that Japan will be obliged eventually to apply the same 
levels of cooperation to bilateral security cooperation with the US in other instances both 
regionally and globally. As House of Representatives LDP Diet Gotōda Masazuki (son of 
Gotōda Masaharu, former Cabinet Secretary) commented, the GOJ of Japan actions may have 
stretched the interpretation of the constitution like an ‘elastic band’ to breaking point, and 
questions have been raised as to whether the US expectation may be for Japan to support a 
future campaign against Iraq.12 
 
Given the surprise at the speed and substance of Japan’s response to the war on terrorism, and 
the divided debate over the exact significance of Japanese actions, the objective of this 
article, taking stock six months after September 11, is to examine the interrelated questions as 
to the reasons why Japan was able to cooperate so rapidly; why it chose the modality of 
response that it did; and what are the actual implications of its chosen response for its overall 
security policy in the future. The argument of the article is that the speed and substance of 
Japan’s response can be accounted for by a possibly unique confluence of international and 
domestic factors, including: Japanese concerns about the need for firm cooperation with the 
US in order to underscore the solidarity of alliance relations and to avoid a repeat of the ‘Gulf 
War’ syndrome over a decade earlier; a degree of shared Japanese abhorence at the 
September 11 attacks and consciousness of the need to cooperate with the international 
community to eliminate terrorism; broad changes in the general domestic debate on security 
in Japan; increased experience of crisis management and legislation framing amongst 
domestic policy-makers, and skilful maneuvering in the Diet to overcome domestic political 
deadlock; and the unique role of the Prime Minister’s office and Prime Minister Koizumi 
himself, with an extraordinary level of public support, in guiding through the legislation.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
10 For instance, see Larry M. Wortzel, ‘Joining forces against terrorism: Japan’s new law commits more than 
words to US effort’, The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, 
http://www.heritage.org/library/backgrounder/bg1500.html. 
11 Far Eastern Economic Review, ‘New rules of defence’, 1 November 2001, p. 20.  
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In terms of the debate on the final implications of the anti-terrorism law, and whether it 
represent a confirmation of traditional patterns of security policy or a turning point and 
abandonment of incrementalism, this article takes something of a middle position. On the one 
hand it argues that in the short term the anti-terrorism law is limited in significance. This is 
indeed because the law is the produce of exceptional international and domestic political 
circumstances; that most of the de jure restrictions on the despatch of the SDF remain in 
place and could, with the necessary political determination be reasserted as de facto 
restrictions; and that Japanese policy-makers employed the same degree of caution and 
ingenuity in framing the new law as in the Shūhen Jitaihō so as to provide them with opt-out 
clauses in future conflict scenarios—all arguing that Japan could well be indicating to the US 
that it would be unlikely to provide further support to the US in the campaign against 
terrorism beyond Afghanistan. In addition, Japan’s actions in other non-military areas of 
security indicates that it is still following and in fact expanding its contribution to global 
security.  
 
On the other hand, though, this article also argues that, despite the caution of Japan’s policy-
makers, the anti-terrorism law does set an important precedent for Japanese security policy 
over the medium to long term. The expansion of the geographical and functional scope of the 
SDF may also come to be applied to the bilateral domain of the US-Japan security treaty, as 
the GOJ finds it politically hard maintain a distinction between the support that it can provide 
to the US in the Afghan conflict under the anti-terrorism law and a regional contingency 
under Shūhen Jitaihō. Just as interestingly, the experience of the anti-terrorism law may not 
be to only force the pace of US-Japan bilateral military cooperation, but may also open up 
further avenues for Japanese cooperation in multilateral contexts. As noted later in the article, 
much of the justification for Japan’s motivation to provide logistical support for the war on 
terrorism has been provided not by Article 9 of the Japanese constitution but by UN 
resolutions and the preamble of the Constitution arguing for international cooperation. Hence, 
even though much of Japan’s support for the US in the Afghan conflict was motivated by the 
need to maintain political and military confidence in the bilateral alliance in other contexts, 
the fact that in this case these operations were actually carried out as part of a broader 
framework legitimised by multilateralism and the UN suggests that Japan may also be 
searching for a larger security role in these areas. as witnessed by its move to change the 
provisions on its participation in UN PKO at the same time. Indeed, it may be the case that 
Japan has now moved to de facto collective security, rather than collective self defence, and 
                                                                                                                                                        
12 Asahi Shimbun Yūkan, 5 October 2001, p. 17. 
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thus a step closer towards realising Ozawa Ichirō’s vision of Japanese security that failed to 
materialise during the Gulf War. 
 
In order to carry out this investigation this article proceeds in the following manner. The first 
section is devoted to a more detailed analysis of the chronology and exact modalities of 
Japan’s response to September 11. This section is necessary in order to provide a pool of 
empirical evidence from which to draw the explanations for the nature of Japan’s actions and 
of their significance for the overall future of its security policy. All these sections are based 
on the extensive use of primary evidence from interviews with policy-makers in Japan, and 
primary evidence from newspapers, academic journals and other publications. 
 
 
GOJ responses to September 11 
 
As noted at the start of this paper, the GOJ’s first official response to the September 11 
attacks was for Prime Minister Koizumi to issue an condemnation of the attacks on the eve of 
the same day (in addition to a personal message of sympathy sent at the same time to 
President George W. Bush and the US citizenry), and then to convene the following morning 
the NSC consisting of the principal members of the Cabinet concerned with security 
matters.13 Koizumi only forty five minutes after hearing of the incident established a liaison 
office (Kantei Renrakushitsu) (later the same day converted to an emergency response office 
[Kantei Taisakushitsu], and then on 8 October later upgraded to the Emergency Anti-
Terrorism Headquarters [Kinkyū Tero Taisaku Honbu]) at the Crisis Management Centre 
within the Prime Minister’s Official Residence (Sōrifu Kantei), led by Chief Cabinet 
Secretary Fukuda Yasuo from the Cabinet Office (Naikakufu), and Assistant Chief Cabinet 
Secretaries Abe Shinzō and Furukawa Teijirō from the Cabinet Secretariat (Naikaku Kanbō). 
This headquarters was assisted by the Office of Crisis Management (Naikaku Kiki 
Kanrishitsu) in the Cabinet Secretariat, and headed by Sugita Kazuhirō, a former analyst at 
the Cabinet Information and Research Office (Naikaku Jōhō Chōsashitsu) In turn, Furukawa 
on 13 September instigated a secret task force, headed by Assistant Cabinet Secretary Ōmori 
Keiji on transfer from the JDA and consisting of key officials from MOFA, the JDA and 
                                                 
13 The NSC of Japan is composed of the following Cabinet ministers and ministers of state: Prime Minister 
(Chairman), the Vice Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of Finance, Chief Cabinet 
Secretary, Chairman of National Public Safety Committee, Director-General of Japan Defense Agency, and the 
Director-General of Economic Planning Agency.  
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Cabinet Legislation Bureau, in order to oversee Koizumi’s policy.14 The augmented and 
crucial role of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet Secretariat team in shaping overall GOJ 
policy is detailed in this and later sections, and represents one potential key development in 
Japanese security policy-making resulting from the September 11 crisis. At the same time, 
GOJ deliberations were to be joined also by officials from MOFA’s functional and regional 
bureaux traditionally entrusted with the management of Japanese security policy (including 
the National Security Policy Division of the Foreign Policy Bureau [FPB], and Japan-US 
Security Treaty Division of the North American Affairs Bureau [NAAB]); from the Japan 
Defence Agency’s Bureau of Defence Policy; and from the senior ranks of the Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) (especially Yamasaki Taku, the LDP Secretary General and close 
Koizumi ally), and its coalition partner New Kōmeitō Party. The GOJ’s immediate six-point 
policy response, already mentioned earlier and which resulted from these pressing overnight 
deliberations, stressed that Japan would gather information on the safety of Japanese 
nationals; consider the despatch of a disaster relief team for all those affected by the terrorist 
incidents; ensure that the Japanese people were updated on the situation; take appropriate 
measures to prevent economic confusion in Japan and the rest of the world in the wake of the 
attacks; and, most importantly for the purposes of this paper, enhance the security of 
‘facilities and establishments related to the US in Japan’, and ‘respond in co-operation with 
the US and other concerned nations to combat international terrorism’.15  
 
After the announcement of this six-point response, there then followed intense discussions 
within Japanese policy-making circles, both in government and amongst the opposition 
parties, as to how to flesh out these promises and to carry policy forward. In terms of those 
policy points designed to provide support for the US and other states to counteract terrorism, 
the enhancement of security for US facilities in Japan, and most particularly military bases, 
was the least controversial and problematic element. Nakatani Gen, Director General of the 
JDA, from the 12 September called for a revision of the SDF laws to permit the guarding of 
US bases on the Japanese main islands and in Okinawa.16 Influential policy-makers in the 
Cabinet, LDP, MOFA and the JDA expressed early and consistent backing for these 
proposals. However, the Kōmeitō and sections of the opposition parties were more cautious, 
seeing these changes in the SDF law as a first step towards the GOJ rolling out long-slated 
and wider emergency legislation (yūji hōsei) powers to loosen restrictions on the deployment 
                                                 
14Asahi Shimbun, 27 September 2001, p. 3; Tomohito Shinoda, Japan’s Response to Terrorism, p. 2, 
http://wwics.si.edu.asia/reports/2001/jpnterr.htm. 
15 Prime Minister’s Office, ‘Government Response Policy Adopted by the National Security Council’, 12 
September 2001, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/saigai/terojiken/taisyo_e.html. 
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of the SDF to cope with armed aggression against Japan, and which they had viewed as 
representing the further remilitarisation of national security policy. More controversial, 
though, and forming the centrepiece of the debate on Japan’s response to September 11 and 
the future course of its security policy were measures concerned with providing support to the 
US and other concerned states to combat terrorism.  
 
MOFA, in line with its general position as the self-appointed guardian of the bilateral 
relationship with the US, was determined from the start that Japan should be seen to make a 
timely and visible contribution to supporting the US and not repeat the mistakes of the Gulf 
War. Immediately following September 11 there appears to have some hesitation within 
MOFA as to what actual shape Japan’s policy response should take, with certain sections of 
the ministry taking the line that the most effective contribution that Japan could make to 
suppress terrorism was a broader comprehensive approach utilising economic power to 
alleviate its causes.17 Japan’s comprehensive notions of dealing with terrorism have arguably 
lived on in its role in providing humanitarian and economic assistance for the reconstruction 
of Afghanistan, as described later in this paper. Nonetheless, MOFA officials were also 
convinced from early on that Japan should demonstrate its commitment to any probable US 
military campaign against terrorism and to international security in general by seeking to 
despatch the SDF. MOFA’s resolve to ensure the despatch of the SDF was evidenced by the 
meeting on 15 September between the then Japanese ambassador to the US, Yanai Shunji, 
and the US Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage. Japanese press reports soon after 
the meeting alleged that Armitage famously requested to Yanai that Japan should ‘show the 
flag’ in supporting the US. Armitage has since refused to disclose the contents of his 
discussions with Yanai, whilst Yanai himself has denied that Armitage used such a phrase.18 
The exact providence of Armitage’s remarks, their exact usage as gaiatsu (external pressure) 
for influencing the course of Japanese policy, and whether in fact the US made any specific 
demands on Japan is discussed in more detail in later sections. But at this point it is suffice to 
note that they were interpreted by MOFA officials as confirmation of their own expectations 
that the US was likely to request some form of SDF despatch for the pursposes of logistical 
support, and that Japan should respond favourably in order to demonstrate political solidarity 
with the US and other states against terrorism.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
16 Asahi Shimbun, 13 September 2001, p. 4. 
17 Asahi Shimbun Yūkan, 13 September 2001, p. 2. 
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The JDA, for its part, was also relatively keen to see SDF despatch in order to satisfy likely 
US expectations of support and to make a clear Japanese commitment to the elimination of 
international terrorism. The JDA’s position also coincided with varying degrees with that of 
the SDF itself. The MSDF in particular, but also the ASDF and Ground Self Defence Force 
(GSDF), were generally supportive of the principle of despatch as means to support a US and 
international campaign against terrorism and simultaneously strengthen their own 
legitimisation; even if, as detailed later on, they were to be given considerable cause for 
anxiety by the unrealistic operational restrictions that they felt were placed upon them once in 
Indian Ocean theatre. In turn, MOFA, JDA and SDF consensus on the correctness of SDF 
despatch was also backed by the bulk of the LDP which also felt an urgent need to be seen to 
respond to US and international demands for action against terrorism.  
 
Deciding the legal framework 
However, whilst there was general agreement on the need for SDF despatch, clear policy 
divisions began to emerge amongst these actors on the issue of the legal framework that 
would make this feasible. Certain sections of the JDA and the LDP initially proposed that the 
GOJ should investigate whether the US-Japan Guidelines for Defence Cooperation and the 
Shūhen Jitaihō could be applied to enable SDF despatch and the provision of logistical 
support to US forces in a military campaign against terrorism.19 The JDA’s logic was that the 
Shūhen Jitaihō provided an existing and carefully constructed framework that could be 
expanded with relative operational ease to areas such as the Indian Ocean, and that any 
attempt to create an alternative law would run the risk of becoming bogged down in 
prolonged Diet debates and prevent Japan from making a speedy response to any forthcoming 
US requests for support.20 MOFA, the LDP, and other elements of the JDA moved to block 
these moves, preferring instead that the GOJ should enact a new legal framework for SDF 
despatch. MOFA’s and these other group’s opposition to the application of the Shūhen 
Jitaihō was derived from a range of factors. The first of these was that, even though as 
MOFA officials admit in private the Shūhen Jitaihō could probably have been reinterpreted 
and stretched to fit the case of the despatch to the Indian Ocean, and agreed with their JDA 
counterparts about the risks of becoming embroiled in Diet debates on a new law, the 
application of the existing law would have raised some unwanted questions about Japan’s 
                                                                                                                                                        
18 The Japan Times Online, 7 October 2001, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-
bin/getarticle.pl5?nn20011007a2.htm; The Japan Time Online, 15 November 2001, 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?np20011115a9.htm. 
19 Tamura Shigenobu, ‘Tero Taisaku Kanrenhō no shushi to pointo’, Jiyū Mishu, November 2001, p. 42. 
20 Asahi Shimbun, 16 September 2001, p. 4. 
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possible exercise of collective self-defence.21 Japanese provision of logistical support to the 
US under the Shūhen Jitaihō is deemed to avoid the exercise of collective self defence as 
SDF operations would be designed to assist US forces to defend Japan itself from 
contingencies in its regional periphery (shūhen) that ‘if left unaddressed would lead to the 
fear of a direct armed attack on Japan’.22 MOFA realised that it would be hard pressed to 
argue that a conflict in Afghanistan would necessarily and directly impact on Japan’s own 
security, and thus that they would also find it difficult to avoid accusations of collective self 
defence if it were to apply the Shūhen Jitaihō in this instance. Instead, and as seen below, 
Japanese policy-makers would need to find another justification and legal framework to 
provide support to the US and still avoid the collective self defence issue. The second 
problem for applying the Shūhen Jitaihō, despite the fact that the GOJ had consistently 
avoided the designation of a strict geographical definition of the scope of Japanese support 
for the US in a regional contingency, and preferred instead a situational definition of the 
scope of SDF action, was that government officials at the time of passage of the Shūhen 
Jitaihō through the Diet had made it clear that the Indian Ocean was not likely to considered 
within the Japan’s regional periphery. Takano Toshiyuki, then Director General of MOFA’s 
NAAB stated in the House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs on 13 May 1998 
that the occurrence of a regional contingency in the Middle East or the Indian Ocean could 
not realistically be imagined to be of a degree sufficient to impact on Japan’s own security 
and thus invoke the revised US-Japan Guidelines; and Prime Minister Obuchi in the House of 
Councillors deliberations on the Shūhen Jitaihō on 28 April 1999 commented that whilst the 
definition of Japan’s periphery could not be strictly geographically defined it did have limits 
which meant that the Middle East and Indian Ocean were not envisaged to be within the 
scope of the bill for the Shūhen Jitaihō.23 Thirdly, the Shūhen Jitaihō stated that Japanese 
logistical support for the US was to be limited to the sea and airspace of areas surrounding 
                                                 
21 Interview with Director level official, National Security Policy Division, Foreign Policy Bureau, MOFA, 
Tokyo, 29 March 2002. 
22 This clause was inserted at the insistence of the New Kōmeitō in the final stages of Diet deliberations on the 
bill. In the Japanese original it reads: ‘sono mama hōchi sureba, waga kuni ni taisuru chokusetsu buryoku kōgi 
ni itaru no osore ga aru jitai’. Shūhen Jitai ni Saishite Waga Kuni no Heiwa oyobi Anzen o Kakuho suru tame 
no Socchi ni Kansuru Hōritsu. 
23 Takano’s remarks can be found in, Dai142kai Kokkai Shūgiin Gaimuiinkai Kaigiroku Dai 11gō, 13 May 
1998, p. 9. Obuchi’s comments are found at Dai145kai Kokkai Sangiin Honkaigi Kaigiroku Dai 17gō, 28 April 
1999, p. 12. The GOJ probably could have got round even Takano’s statement if it was really felt necessary. 
Takano was later removed from his post for confirming on 22 May 1998 in the same committee that the 
definition of the shūhen was based on the original Far East definition of the range of the US-Japan security 
treaty pronounced by the government following the treaty’s revision in 1960 and which included the area north 
of the Philippines and Taiwan. Asahi Shimbun, 28 May 1998, p. 2.The removal of Takano from his post and 
disowning of his comments, and subsequent GOJ restressing of the situational nature of the Guidelines, could 
have given MOFA some legitimisation to stretch the Guidelines and Shūhen Jitaihō to the Indian Ocean if 
absolutely necessary.  
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Japan.24 MOFA and other elements of the GOJ in the immediate aftermath of September 11 
(even if not eventually implemented) had the apparent intention of seeking to despatch the 
GSDF to the ground territory of states bordering the Indian Ocean region, but this would have 
been instantly ruled out if the Shūhen Jitaihō has been applied.25 Finally, MOFA and other 
policy-makers feared that the willful stretching of the Shūhen Jitaihō to meet the demands of 
an Afghan conflict could provide a hazardous precedent that would override strenuous 
government efforts in previous years to limit and retain control over the functional and 
geographical scope of US-Japan military cooperation.26 
  
This intergovernmental wrangling was decisively broken on 17 September by the 
intervention of Koizumi who instructed MOFA, the JDA and LDP Secretary General 
Yamasaki to prepare a new anti-terrorism law to enable SDF despatch.27 Koizumi’s exercise 
of his prime ministerial leadership and bid for the passing of an anti-terrorism law at the 
required rapid speed was partly a gamble based on the previous experience of Diet 
deliberations on security legislation. However, Koizumi and his Kantei advisers were given 
confidence at the time by the Prime Minister’s phenomenally high personal popularity rating, 
and also were possessed of the genuine conviction that Japan had to respond proactively to 
US and international expectations for assistance to eradicate terrorism, and that SDF despatch 
was the next crucial stage in this response.28 Consequently, Koizumi’s government, having 
resolved to create an anti-terrorism law, then announced its Basic Policy and list of seven 
immediate measures in response to the attacks on the US, the most prominent element of 
which was a promise to despatch the SDF. The GOJ’s Basic Policy, as announced by 
Koizumi, stated that Japan would under its own ‘initative’ (shutai teki ni) engage in 
combating terrorism which it also regards as its ‘own security issue’; strongly support the US 
as its ally and other concerned states; and take concrete, swift. effective and comprehensive 
measures to demonstrate its determination on this issue.29 The GOJ’s seven-point plan from 
points four to seven promised that Japan would strengthen international cooperation, 
including information sharing, in areas such as immigration control; extend humanitarian 
assistance to affected states, especially Pakistan and India, which were cooperating with the 
US; provide assistance to displaced persons; and again take appropriate measures to avoid 
                                                 
24 Shūhen Jitai ni Saishite Waga Kuni no Heiwa oyobi Anzen o Kakuho suru tame no Socchi ni Kansuru 
Hōritsu, Article 1, Clause 3. 
25 Yachi Shōtarō, ‘9.11 tero kōgeki to Nihon no taiō’, Kokusai Mondai, No. 503, February 2002, p. 12.   
26 Asahi Shimbun, 16 September 2001, p. 4. 
27 Asahi Shimbun, 19 September, p. 1.  
28 Interview with LDP House of Councillors Diet Member, Tokyo, 4 April 2002. 
29 Koizumi Naikaku Sōri Daijin Kisha Kaikenroku, 19 September 2001, 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/koizumispeech/2001/0919sourikaiken.html. 
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international economic disruption. The first three points of the plan, as well as point six, 
concerned SDF despatch: the GOJ promising that it would take the necessary measures to 
enable the SDF to provide logistical support for US and other forces engaged in operations 
against terrorism; to embark on MSDF information gathering missions; to provide 
humanitarian assistance; and to guard US facilities in Japan. Koizumi then effectively sealed 
the GOJ’s international pledge for the despatch of the SDF when he reinterated Japan’s 
intention to provide logistical support for the US and other states during his talks with 
President Bush in Washington on 25 September.30 
 
Consequently, as a result of the Kantei’s leadership, and the announcement of the seven-point 
plan and SDF despatch and promises to the US, policy-making discussions amongst MOFA, 
the JDA and LDP (even though certain elements of the JDA and LDP continued to argue for 
the use of the Shūhen Jitaihō) effectively shifted to focus on the actual contents of SDF 
activities under the proposed anti-terrorism law as well as other related laws, the means to 
justify the new law’s constitutionality, and the political methods to ensure its swift passage 
through anticipated opposition both from within the coalition government itself and from the 
opposition parties in the Diet.  
 
Proposed SDF activities 
In terms of the actual contents of the bill for the anti-terrorism law, key GOJ policy actors, 
whilst all seeking to enable SDF despatch in support of the US and other states within the 
possible limits of constitutional interpretations, differed in the degree of emphasis they 
attached to certain types of SDF activities. MOFA, the JDA, and the LDP were in clear 
agreement that the SDF’s principal contribution should be logistical and at least match that of 
the Shūhen Jitaihō in its functional scope, and thus include activities such as MSDF 
refuelling and logistical supply for the US Navy. MOFA’s apparent intention from early on, 
however, was to go beyond the functional and geographical scope of the Shūhen Jitaihō and 
revised US-Japan Guidelines by including in the bill the provision to enable the SDF to 
engage in humanitarian and medical operations for the benefit of US personnel and refugees 
on the ground in India and on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. For MOFA, these types of 
operations, along with MSDF despatch, would serve as highly visible forms of Japan’s 
human contribution and of ‘flying the flag’. As noted earlier on, the International Peace 
Cooperation Law had permitted ASDF operations to airlift humanitarian supplies to Pakistan 
and India since early October 2001, and would have permitted similar GSDF missions in 
                                                 
30 Asahi Shimbun, 26 September 2001, p. 1. 
 16
these states, if they had not already been barred by provisions of the same law which stated 
that SDF activities should take place in non-combat zones, a distinction that could not have 
been guaranteed on the volatile Pakistan border. Moreover, the restrictions on the use of 
weapons in the Shūhen Jitaihō and the International Peace Cooperation Law for the 
protection of individual SDF personnel and their units would have also limited the ability of 
the SDF to provide protection to US medical casualties and the potential influx of refugees on 
the Pakistan border.31 Hence, MOFA’s determination was to insert two provisions into the 
law, absent from other forms of security legislatiion. The first enabled the despatch of the 
SDF to the ground territory of states around the Indian Ocean, by expanding the physical 
scope of SDF activities to the air, sea and land. The second provision expanded the use of 
weapons by the SDF to encompass the protection of ‘the lives of those persons under their 
own control’ (jikō no kanri no moto ni haitta mono no seimei), which could thus be read as 
US casualties and refugees.32 
 
JDA policy-makers shared MOFA’s view on the need for Japan to demonstrate a human 
contribution to the campaign against terrorism through SDF despatch. Nonetheless, MOFA’s 
known and increasing willingness since the early to commit the SDF to PKO and other 
similar types of missions as a symbol of Japan’s political commitment to international 
security cooperation and to extinguish the humiliation of the Gulf War, was counterbalanced 
to some degree by the JDA’s knowledge of the operational difficulties often involved and the 
concomitant need for caution in despatching the SDF to uncertain theatres such as the Indian 
Ocean and surrounding states. The GSDF in particular was concerned that MOFA’s interest 
in despatch to Pakistan could lead to its exposure to terrorist attack and a combat scenario for 
which is was unequipped both legally in terms of rule of engagement and physically in terms 
of materiel and weapons. Prime Minister Koizumi’s statement at a press conference on 24 
April the day before he was due to meet President Bush and pledge SDF despatch further 
raised JDA concerns. Koizumi commented that the possibility could not be excluded of the 
SDF being placed in a ‘harzadous position’ (kiken na tokoro) when carrying out its logistic 
activities; a comment read by GSDF as reiterating possible despatch to Pakistan.33  
 
                                                 
31 Shūhen Jitai ni Saishite Waga Kuni no Heiwa oyobi Anzen o Kakuho suru tame no Socchi ni Kansuru Hōritsu 
Article 10, Clause 3.  
32 Heisei Jūsannen Kugatsu Jūichinichi no America Gashūkoku ni oite Hassei shita Terorisuto ni yoru Kōgeki 
nado ni Taiō shite Okanawareru Kokusai Rengō Kenshō no Mokuteki no Shogaikoku no Katsudō ni taishite 
Waga Kuni ga Jisshi suru Sochi oyobi Kanren suru Kokusai Rengō Ketsugi nado ni Motozuku Jindōteki Sochi ni 
Kansuru Tokubetsu Sochihō, Buki no Shiyō. 
33 Asahi Shimbun, 25 September 2001, p. 1.  
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Instead, the preferred input of the JDA into planning for SDF despatch and the design of the 
anti-terrorism law was directed towards measures related to the MSDF—a form of despatch 
thought far less risky due to its distance from the combat zone in Afghanistan and the obvious 
inability of al-Qaeda to deploy any forces at sea. The MSDF itself, traditionally enjoying the 
closest strategic and operational contacts of the three services of the SDF with the US 
military, and based on the positive experience of minesweeper despatch to the Persian Gulf in 
1991, was clearly keen to impress on its cautious civilian JDA overseers that Japan’s most 
important contribution to the US and other states would be at sea through a variety of means. 
34 The MSDF’s first concern was that it should provide protection for the assets of the US 7th 
Navy home ported in Japan. The US Navy seems to have genuinely feared that its aircraft 
carrier the USS Kitty Hawk would be a vulnerable target for terrorist attack whilst in dock at 
Yokosuka, and thus ordered the ship to put to sea on the 21 September to carry out exercises 
close to Okinawa. The JDA on the same day sent an MSDF destroyer and four minesweepers, 
in conjunction with Japan Coast Guard (JCG) vessels, to accompany the Kitty Hawk from 
harbour and out of Tokyo Bay. This was the first time that MSDF ships had accompanied the 
US Navy in non-exercise conditions and for some observers indicated a reversal in the GOJ’s 
previous stance that escort duties by the MSDF were act of collective self defence.35 The JDA 
justified this MSDF despatch as ‘necessary investigation and research for the conduct of 
operations’ in line with the Defence Agency Establishment Law, and as such a coincidental 
activity not designed for the protection of the Kitty Hawk and not an act of collective self 
defence. Nevertheless, the MSDF’s obvious intention was to provide an escort for the Kitty 
Hawk, and the JDA Director General Nakatani acknowledged this de facto escort mission 
when he noted on 22 September that the MSDF ships ‘went with’ the Kitty Hawk because 
there was a fear of its being subject to terrorist attack which could then impact on Japan’s 
own security.36  
 
Aegis despatch controversy 
In addition to escort missions, the MSDF also argued that it should be permitted to use the 
same legal provision for the despatch of ships to the Indian Ocean for ‘information gathering’ 
missions in order to preempt the further legal justification likely to come with the anti-
terrorism law and to provide early assistance for the US in the region. The MSDF’s initial 
objective was to secure the despatch of one of its prized Aegis-equipped Kongō-class 
                                                 
34 Interview with MSDF officer and member of MSDF Staff Office, JDA, Tokyo, 26 March 2002. 
35 For instance, in October 1990 during the build up for the Gulf War, the US requested that the MSDF escort 
the aircraft carrier USS Midway from Yokosuka to the East China Sea, but this was refused by the GOJ as a 
possible act of collective self-defence. Asahi Shimbun, 21 September 2001, p. 1.  
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destroyers. Aegis-equipped destroyers, designed for air defence, are the most advanced 
MSDF asset: mounting SPY-1 radar equipment with a range of five hundred kilometres and 
that can track two hundred objects at once; deploying SM-2 missiles (Standard Missile) that 
can be launched simultaneously at up to twenty targets over a one hundred kilometre range; 
and capable of digital data exchange with US Navy ships by means of Link-11 and Link-14 
systems. Japan acquired these technologies and the entire AWS system itself from the US, 
and thus its Kongō-class destroyers would have been fully interoperable with the three Aegis-
equipped destroyers that the US was to despatch to the Indian Ocean.37 The MSDF argued 
that the Kongō-class destroyers would therefore be the most appropriate asset to spearhead its 
despatch to the Indian Ocean—its advanced capabilities ensuring the best defence for Japan’s 
own forces in an uncertain theatre of operations, and its interoperability ensuring the most 
flexible range of support possible for the US above all but also other states. Nonetheless, as 
will be seen below, these advanced characteristics of the Aegis destroyers were to become the 
very reason that its despatch was opposed by other elements of the policy community, and the 
MSDF’s contribution was limited to less advanced ships assets and the types of logistical 
support and refuelling found in the anti-terrorism law.   
 
Opinion within the LDP, again whilst in general agreement with the need for some form of 
SDF despatch, was divided over the exact contents of permissible SDF activities and force 
structures. LDP policy-makers taking a more ‘hawkish’ line on SDF despatch, advocated that 
the anti-terrorism law should exceed the Shūhen Jitaihō and include the transport and 
provision of weapons and ammunition to US and other forces.38 The more ‘doveish’ elements 
of the LDP, including many senior figures mindful of the need to speed the bill through the 
Diet and past their Kōmeitō coalition partner and opposition parties, were more cautious 
about establishing this new precedent for SDF activities. These LDP members were also 
concerned about JDA plans for the despatch of Aegis-equipped destroyers for a variety of 
reasons. The first and relatively minor reason was that Japan’s despatch of such a highly 
capable weapons platform as far as the Indian Ocean could be seen as an extreme indication 
to neighbouring states such as China and South Korea of Japan’s intent to exercise military 
force beyond its own territory. of Japan’s intent (the Aegis system serving as the potential 
platform for Japanese development of a Ballistic Missile Defence [BMD] system, and its 
deployment far from Japan serving to confirm possible Chinese fears that Japan might be 
                                                                                                                                                        
36 Asahi Shimbun, 23 September 2001, p. 2. 
37 Tada Tomohiko, ‘Kaiji Indoyō haken kantai to Ījisukan’, Gunji Kenkyū, February 2002, pp. 87-91. 
38 Asahi Shimbun, 22 September 2001, p. 4. 
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prepared in the future to deploy a missile shield around Taiwan).39 The second reason was the 
fear that the SDF’s possession of actual capabilities in the field could determine it to follow 
certain types of undesired military action. The anxiety of certain observers was that the 
Aegis’s air defence capabilities could place the MSDF in scenarios where it might be 
requested to shoot down a hijacked airliner that was a threat to coalition forces, or that the 
fire control computers on board might accidentally fire upon civilian air traffic in the same 
way that US Aegis ships destroyed an Iranian airliner in the Gulf in 1988.40 Arguably, these 
scenarios were somewhat unrealistic, and LDP policy-makers were uninformed about the 
actual capabilities and safeguards of the Aegis system, but they became factors that were to 
weigh against the despatch of Kongō class destroyers. The third and most important reason 
for opposition to the Aegis despatch was the problem of the potential exercise collective self-
defence derived from the ability of MSDF ships to seamlessly data link with their US 
counterparts. According to the Cabinet Legislation Bureau, MSDF data-linking and 
information sharing with the US Navy does not represent an act of collective self defence as 
long as the information shared is of a general nature and does not lead to the direct use of 
force by the US against a specific target. Hence, the MSDF would be able constitutionally to 
inform the US Navy about movements in air traffic detected by its SPY-1 radar. But if the US 
were then found to have used this information supplied by Japan in order to shoot down a 
particular plane, this would be deemed as an act of collective self defence. LDP policy-
makers clearly felt that this ability to data-link, and the problems of distinguishing during 
operational conditions different streams of information for different purposes, could have led 
to accusations of Japan exercising the right of collective self defence. Added to this, LDP 
policy-makers were also concerned that the interoperability of US Navy and MSDF Aegis-
equipped ships could also lead to requests from the US for Japan to take over certain air 
defence operations if the US was forced to deploy its Aegis assets elsewhere as the conflict in 
Afghanistan and in other areas such as the Persian Gulf progressed. LDP policy-makers again 
shied away from this as a case of military technology determining SDF tactical operations 
and challenging interpretations of collective self defence.41 Influential LDP figures such as 
Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda, Yamasaki Taku and Nonaka Hiromu, although not able to 
totally eliminate proposals for Aegis despatch, seem to have decided that the best way for the 
                                                 
39 Christopher W. Hughes, ‘Sino-Japanese relations and ballistic missile defence’, in Marie Söderberg (ed.), 
Chinese-Japanese Relations in the Twenty First Century: Complementarity and Conflict, London, Routledge, 
2002, pp. 74-76. 
40 Asahi Shimbun, 28 October 2001, p. 2; Interview with retired MSDF Rear-Admiral, Okazaki Institute, Tokyo, 
4 April 2002. 
41 Interview with Assistant Director-level JDA official, Bureau of Defence Policy, JDA, Tokyo, 22 March 2002. 
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MSDF to avoid being placed in these types of operational dilemmas was to deprive them of 
the military capability to be able to make such choices in the first place.42  
 
However, as elements of the policy-making community and military analysts have pointed 
out, in many ways these LDP figures appear to have lacked a serious understanding of the 
Aegis and other MSDF capabilities and so created an ineffective or even dangerous policy for 
despatch. For even though opposition to Aegis despatch would have countered scenarios such 
as the MSDF taking over certain key air defence roles from the US, the actual MSDF ships 
that were eventually dispatched still deployed Link-11 and Link-14 capabilites and could still 
exchange information smoothly with the US Navy, and thus create similar if less extreme 
problems of collective self defence. In addition, others have argued that the MSDF’s lack of a 
highly effective air defence such as Aegis when deployed in the Indian Ocean actually 
endangered Japan’s forces on two counts: firstly, they could not defend themselves from 
possible attacks, but, secondly, and perhaps more seriously given the nature of coalition 
deployments in the region, they might not be fully privy to all warnings on  air traffic 
movements and fully coordinated with the forces of other states, so leading to the risk of 
‘blue on blue’ or ‘friendly fire’ upon Japanese ships.43 
 
Legal justifications and the UN 
In terms of the necessary justification for SDF activities under the proposed anti-terrorism 
law, GOJ policy-makers had to exercise their usual considerable ingenuity in the 
interpretation of constitutional restrictions. Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan presented 
two principal difficulties for Japan’s despatch of the SDF to provide logistical support for US 
and other forces engaged in a military campaign against terrorism. The first of these was that 
SDF despatch should not constitute an integral part of the use of force (buryoku kōshi to 
ittaika suru), and secondly, interrelated with this, that Japan should not be seen to exercise 
collective self defence. The first difficulty was handled relatively easily by using the 
precedent of the Shūhen Jitaihō which had already established in Diet deliberations the 
accepted principle that Japan’s provision of logistical support to the US would not constitute 
its joining a conflict and the use of force as long as the SDF activities took place outside the 
demarcated line of the combat zone (sentō kōdō to wa issen o kaku suru basho).44 During the 
passage of the anti-terrorism through the Diet this principle was not to be seriously 
                                                 
42 Interview with LDP House of Councillors Diet Member, Tokyo, 4 April 2002 
43 Interview with MSDF officer and member of MSDF Staff Office, JDA, Tokyo, 26 March 2002. 
44 Shūhen Jitai ni Saishite Waga Kuni no Heiwa oyobi Anzen o Kakuho suru tame no Socchi ni Kansuru 
Hōritsu, Article 6. 
 21
challenged despite the fact that to many observers its appeared that Japan’s supply of logistics 
and fuel to US forces which were then destined for combat operations, even if SDF actions 
took place outside the combat zone, was essentially the same as the use of force; and, indeed, 
MSDF officers have maintained that it is nearly impossible in operational terms at sea to 
distinguish exactly where the shifting boundaries of the combat zone lie. The GOJ’s attempt 
to distinguish Japanese actions from the use of force was to be further reinforced by its 
writing into the anti-terrorism law that the SDF would not supply maintenance or fuel to 
aircraft about to take off on military sorties.45 
 
The second issue of collective self defence was to prove more complex for the GOJ, its 
position being that Japan inherently possesses this right as a sovereign state under Article 51 
of the UN Charter, but that it cannot exercise this right due to interpretations of Article 9 of 
the Constitution which view participation in collective self defence as exceeding the limits of 
the necessary force for self defence. Japan in the case of the Shūhen Jitaihō was able to 
circumvent the issue of collective self defence as SDF actions under the law in support of the 
US could more easily be predicated as functioning for the defence of Japan itself. However, 
as noted in the section above, Japan was unable to draw the same connection between US 
forces engaged in actions in Afghanistan and its own security, and added to this its position 
was further complicated by the particular justification that the US and its other allies had 
selected for their campaign against terrorism. The UN Security Council (UNSC) on 12 
September unanimously adopted Resolution 1368 expressing its condemnation of the attacks 
and determination ‘to combat by all means threats to international peace and security caused 
by terrorist acts’, and recognising the inherent right of individual and collective self defence 
called on all member states to cooperate to bring the perpetrators of the attacks to justice.46 
This was followed by on 28 September by Resolution 1373 which authorised states to take  a 
range of political and economic steps necessary to prevent the ‘commission of terrorist 
acts’.47 The US (and also the UK) nonetheless made clear when reporting to the UNSC on 7 
October concerning its subsequent military actions in Afghanistan that these were legitimised 
based upon the invocation of Article 51 of the UN Charter and the rights of collective and 
self defence.48 In the meantime, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) response 
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to September 11 was to invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and to support the US 
based on the principle of collective self defence. The GOJ in seeking to articulate the 
legitimisation for its own response to September was then faced with the problem that the US 
was largely eschewing UN resolutions and justifying its military actions as an act of 
individual self defence, and that the US’s NATO allies were providing support as an act of 
collective self defence. For Japan the clear implication was that any support it provided could 
be construed as for the benefit of the individual security of the US and as mirroring NATO’s 
invocation of collective security in coming to the aid of the US as an ally, and thereby 
constituting a breach of its own restrictions on the exercise of the right of collective self 
defence.  
 
The path that the Japanese government took to navigate its way around this issue was to 
switch the emphasis away from the exercise of collective self defence towards an 
interpretation of the Constitution and SDF actions that stressed instead something akin to the 
concept of collective security. The GOJ was able to do this by switching at the same time the 
emphasis away from Article 9 as the sole justification of Japanese actions towards the 
Preamble of the Constitution, and by employing UN Resolution 1368 as the bridge between 
the Constitution and the anti-terrorism law. GOJ policy-makers were able to draw attention to 
the Preamble which states that Japan desires, ‘to occupy an honoured place in an international 
society striving for the preservation of peace, and the banishment of tyranny and slavery, 
oppression and intolerance’, and that it pledges its ‘national honour to accomplish these high 
ideals and purposes with all our resources’. GOJ policy-makers were also able to point to the 
fact that the UN as the highest representative of international society had issued a call under 
Resolution 1368 to all its members, including by implication Japan, to cooperate in order to 
combat terrorist actions which had been designated as threats to the preservation of 
international peace and security. Hence, the Preamble provided the justification for GOJ 
policy-makers to seek to cooperate with UN and Resolution 1368 to combat terrorism. In the 
turn, the next obstacle for the GOJ was how to connect Japanese cooperation with the UN 
with cooperation with its US ally, which, as noted above, had itself preferred to avoid the 
active use of UN resolutions in order to legitimise its actions in Afghanistan, and favoured 
instead the exercise of the right of individual and collective self defence. The ingenuity of 
GOJ policy-makers was evident here in the way in which they sought to utilise and interpret 
Resolution 1368 as the basis of Japanese actions. Japan’s policy-makers, although they 
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acknowledged those sections of the resolution that identified the US as the target of the 
terrorist attacks and reaffirmed the rights of states to respond on the basis of individual and 
collective self defence, emphasised instead the other sections of the resolution which 
identified the attacks as a threat to ‘international peace and security’ and called on concerned 
states to combat terrorism to preserve international peace. Hence, the GOJ sought to stress 
that the terrorism of September 11 was not just an attack on the US per se, but more widely 
upon international security in general. In this way, the GOJ would be able to portray it actions 
against terrorism as not designed to come to the specific assistance of the US, which would 
have constituted an act of collective self defence, but as designed to contribute to overall 
international peace and stability, so approximating more to an act of collective security rather 
than collective self defence. GOJ policy-makers could also reverse this logic to legitimise the 
provision of Japanese support to the US in its actions against terrorism. The GOJ argued that 
this was not support designed to assist the US in a campaign to defend the US homeland in 
response to September, but was support designed to assist the US in a broader campaign—
based on UN Resolution 1368, even if the US did not itself use actively this particular 
legitimisation—to preserve international peace and security from terrorism. Moreover, to cap 
all this, the GOJ could also argue that its support for the US could not constitute an act of 
collective self defence as it did not involve the use of force on the part of Japan, as noted 
above. .  
 
The exact significance of this shift to the utilisation of the Preamble, UN resolutions, and 
emphasis on collective security for the future of Japanese security policy is explored in later 
sections. At this juncture, though, it is simply important to stress that GOJ policy-makers 
were to seek to formulate a legal framework to enable the de jure despatch of the SDF within 
the context of Japan’s support for the UN, even though the actual de facto content of SDF 
activities was to be overwhelmingly devoted to support for Japan’s bilateral ally the US. GOJ 
emphasis upon the UN and collective security-oriented legitimisation for providing support to 
the campaign against terrorism and for SDF despatch was demonstrated by the constant 
references of its policy-makers to Japan’s contribution to international security as a whole 
rather than to specifically assisting the US. From immediately after September 11,  through to 
the unveiling of the GOJ seven-point policy package, and well beyond the discussions of the 
formulation of the anti-terrorism law, policy makers consciously stressed that Japan was 
acting ‘on its own initiative’ to avoid accusations of exercising collective self-defence in 
responding to September 11, and that it was acting not only in conjunction with the US but 
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also ‘other concerned states’ and the UN to counteract terrorism for the benefit of 
international peace and security. Indeed, the GOJ cautious framing of the anti-terrorism law 
to predicate Japanese actions on the basis of the US is demonstrated by its very name and 
contents. After some deliberation, the extremely cumbersome name of the law was designed 
to demonstrate that SDF actions would be in support of all foreign countries, not solely the 
US, to combat terrorism and that it was designed to achieve the aims of the UN. Clause 2 of 
the law was also to emphasise that GOJ actions were legitmised, ‘recalling that UNSC 
Resolution 1368 regards the terrorist attacks which took place on September 11 in the US as a 
threat to international peace and security…’, and that this and other UN resolutions call on 
Japan, ‘to contribute actively and on its own initiatives to the efforts of the international 
community for the prevention and eradication of international terrorism, thereby ensuring the 
peace and security of the international community including Japan.’.49 In addition, each 
reference to Japanese support for US forces is complemented with the phrase that this support 
is also to be provided to other concerned states, thereby throwing the emphasis of Japan’s 
actions away from the US-Japan relationship.. 
 
Passage of the law through the Diet 
The next step for Japan’s policy-makers having decided the necessary contents and 
legitimisation for the anti-terrorism law was to frame it in Diet bill form and ensure its 
passage past the Kōmeitō and opposition parties. The JDA’s argument that the Shūhen Jitaihō 
could form the basis for SDF despatch was proved partially correct in that, even though an 
alternative law was devised by the GOJ, the earlier law served as the blueprint for the 
framing of controversial security legislation. As noted above, the Shūhen Jitaihō had already 
established a variety of functional areas in which Japan could provide logistical support for 
the US, and these precedents were also applied with relative ease to the anti-terrorism law. 
GOJ policy-makers were also aware, based on the experience of the disastrous experience of 
the UN Peace Cooperation Corps Bill in 1990, when under-prepared government spokesmen 
were humiliated in Diet debates, that their best chance to pilot the bill through would be to 
utilise JDA Director General Nakatani to respond to opposition questions rather than the 
capricious Minister of Foreign Affairs Tanaka Makiko. Hence, Koizumi took effective charge 
of policy formulation and, much to the chagrin of his supposedly kanban daijin, effectively 
excluded Tanaka from policy discussions and Diet debates on the anti-terrorism law.50 
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Nevertheless, the GOJ and LDP faced considerable potential opposition from the Kōmeitō 
and main opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) with regard to certain components of 
the bill, if not with regard to the entire bill in the case of the Liberal Party (LP), Social 
Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ) and Japan Communist Party (JCP). The support of the 
Kōmeitō was essential to ensure the passage of the bill in the House of Representatives and 
especially in the House of Councillors where the LDP lacked an overall majority. Kōmeitō’s 
doveish instincts, but also its desire to stay in the coalition government meant, that it could be 
persuaded to fall into line with the LDP if the necessary concessions were made. Hence, the 
LDP conceded to the Kōmeitō demand that a clause be inserted into bill limiting the life of 
the anti-terrorism law to a two year period only renewable for a further two years by the 
formulation of a separate law, and the Kōmeitō was also influential in persuading the LDP to 
drop the transport and supply of arms from the bill.51 Moreover, the Kōmeitō at the stage of 
Diet committee deliberation on the bill on 9 September demanded from the GOJ that it insert 
into the bill a previously absent article (to become Article 5) that insisted on Diet approval of 
the Basic Plan which was mandated under the law and would set out the details of the form of 
SDF despatch.52  
 
The LDP faced a tougher task in attempting to persuade the DPJ to demonstrate solidarity 
with the government and to vote in favour of the bill. DPJ leader Hatoyama Yukio found 
himself an awkward position sandwiched between the different wings of his centrist party. 
Hatoyama clearly wanted to break with the image of the SDPJ as the main former opposition 
party which had gained itself a reputation as the ‘oppose everything party’ (nandemo hantai), 
especially on security issues, and wanted to put forward a consistent platform on security that 
would enable his party to been as a serious contender to replace the LDP in government.53 
Hatoyama’s position was also supported by a range of DPJ Diet members, drawn originally 
from the LDP or newly elected since the breakdown of the 1955 system, that wanted to see a 
more proactive Japanese stance on security. Hatoyama himself and these members, although 
not as closely wedded to the US-Japan alliance as their LDP counterparts, were certainly in 
sympathy with the need for Japan to respond to the threat of September 11 by SDF despatch 
in support of the US and international community. At the same, time, though Hatoyama had 
to respond to the other wing of his party drawn predominantly from ex-SDPJ members which 
were opposed to SDF despatch. The result of these differing perspectives on Japan’s 
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contribution was a policy split in the DPJ, which Hatoyama could only attempt to resolve by 
taking a compromise position on the anti-terrorism bill. After considerable deliberation, 
Hatoyama put forward what he hoped would be the DPJ’s unified position that insisted upon 
there being prior approval by the Diet for the Basic Plan for SDF despatch; that there be no 
loosening of restrictions on the use of weapons by the SDF; that there should be no transport 
and supply of arms; and that the anti-terrorism law should expire after one year (later 
changed to two years after consultations with the Kōmeitō and LDP).54  
 
The LDP anticipated and responded to the DPJ’s position by both trying to split it and 
cooptation. The first tactic considered by the LDP was to propose through back channels that 
the DPJ in conjunction with the other main parties might itself consider submitting a bill in 
order to provide an image of Japanese unity in response to the September 11 attacks, to help 
push the measures though the Diet, and to help counterbalance the possible veto influence of 
the Kōmeitō over LDP activities.55 In the end, the GOJ and LDP decided instead the DPJ’s 
resistance to the stretching of constitutional interpretations was likely to make this 
impractical, and it was decided to submit it as a Cabinet bill. The LDP also made moves to 
placate the DPJ by appointing former LDP Secretary General Katō Kōichi, known to have 
close connections with many of the younger DPJ members, as the chairman on the Diet 
committee to deliberate on the bills. Finally, the LDP also demonstrated some willingness to 
make concessions to the DPJ on the contents of the bill. The LDP was motivated to drop the 
measure for the transport of arms to satisfy both the Kōmeitō and DPJ; and in the final stages 
of the deliberation of the bill seemed prepared to not only insert a clause for Diet approval of 
the Basic Plan for SDF despatch as argued for by the Kōmeitō, but also make this approval 
prior rather than after despatch as the LDP originally conceived.  
 
In the end, though, Hatoyama proved unable to carry his party with him on the issue of the 
anti-terrorism law. Hatoyama’s close discussions with Koizumi on the issue of prior Diet 
approval failed on 15 September. The DPJ was thus left to vote against the bill for the anti-
terrorism law alongside the three other opposition parties. The SDPJ opposed the bill on the 
grounds that it constituted an act of collective self defence and that the terrorist acts were not 
acts of war but heinous crimes that required alternative responses justified by true 
international action. The JCP criticised SDF despatch under the bill as the use of force and a 
contravention of Article 9 of the Constitution, and the entire action against terrorism as a war 
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of revenge with no justification in international law. Ozawa Ichirō’s LP followed its usual 
line of opposition, Ozawa himself boycotting cross-party talks with Koizumi, arguing that the 
bill was in de facto terms the use of force and collective self defence and that the government 
should come clean on this and avoid further deceptions in its interpretations of Article 9. 
  
Japan’s measures in the war against terrorism 
The anti-terrorism law and the revisions to the SDF Law to allow the guarding of US 
facilities in Japan duly passed the House of Representatives on 16 October. Following this, 
Koizumi was then able to travel to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit 
in Shanghai and to demonstrate to President Bush and the international community that it was 
proceeding towards the fulfillment of its pledge for SDF despatch. Following, the passage of 
the law through the House of Councillors, GOJ efforts then switched to designing the Basic 
Law and the exact form of SDF despatch. As noted in the introduction to this paper, the 
MSDF despatched its first flotilla to the Indian Ocean before the Basic Plan was decided and 
using the justification of ‘information gathering’ under the Defence Agency Establishment 
Law. This MSDF despatch and the two subsequent flotillas were later justified under the 
Basic Plan and then received Diet approval within the twenty day period following the 
announcement of the plan. The JDA and MSDF were indeed provided with the major 
Japanese contribution to the campaign against terrorism, but were ultimately denied their 
wish for Aegis despatch for the reasons listed above, although the GOJ officially refused to 
rule out the role of Aegis destroyers in the future. MOFA also lost out on Aegis despatch (a 
decision which was said to have ‘appalled’ sections of the ministry) but received most of its 
wish list in the anti-terrorism law.56 In particular it secured the provisions for SDF activities 
on the ground. Although in the end these missions were not carried out, the Pakistan situation 
being deemed as too risky and the lack of US casualties arguing against the necessity of 
GSDF operations.  
 
In the meantime, whilst the GOJ was devising the military aspects of its response to 
September 11, it also devoted considerable policy energy to diplomatic and economic 
measures against terrorism. On 19 September, Koizumi sent letters to the leaders of Egypt, 
Iran, Saudi Arabia and Qatar (states with which Japan has traditionally cultivated close 
relations since the Oil Shocks of the 1970s), urging them to support the international effort 
against terrorism. Senior Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Sugiura Seiken visited Pakistan 
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on 25-26 September and handed a letter from Koizumi conveying Japan’s support for 
Pakistani efforts against terrorism. The GOJ also sent former foreign minister Kōmura 
Masahiko as a special envoy to Saudi Arabia and Iran from 30 September to 5 October; and 
former prime minister Hashimoto Ryūtarō to Egypt and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), 
and for discussions with the Secretary General of the Arab League of States and Yasser 
Arafat of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) from 7-12 October. Muneo Suzuki, 
due to his close (later to become the subject of scandal) connections with the Central Asian 
republics, was selected as a special envoy to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan from 6-9 October. 
Former prime minister Mori Yoshirō was appointed as special envoy to India and Pakistan 
(Koizumi and his advisers again deliberately acquiescing in the exclusion of Foreign Minister 
Tanaka from this diplomacy) from 28 to 31 October; and the Pakistani finance minister 
visited Japan as a special envoy of his president from 31 October to 3 November.57  
 
On the economic front, Japan, in line with the promises of its Basic Policy and UN 
Resolutions 1267 and 1333, also took measures on 22 September and 26 October to freeze 
the assets and restrict the money flows of a total of one hundred and eighty eight individuals 
and groups related to the Taliban. On 22 September and then on 16 November, the GOJ 
decided to provide a total of US$300 million of bilateral assistance to Pakistan over the 
following two years for education, health and poverty reduction. The GOJ on October 26 also 
discontinued its limited sanctions on India and Pakistan which had included the suspension of 
grant aid and yen loans, and which had been  imposed since May 1998 in response to their 
nuclear testing activities Japan’s ‘assistance to countries surrounding Afghanistan’ also took 
the form of a total of US$18 million to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. In addition to the 
emergency humanitarian assistance transported by the ASDF and MSDF to Pakistan, as of 
February 2002 the GOJ has provided a total of US$102 million via the UN and other agencies 
to Afghan refugees and a pool of ¥580 million to Japanese non-governmental organisations 
(NGO) for refugee assistance. This Japanese activity then culminated in its recognition on 22 
December of the Interim Authority as the legitimate government of Afghanistan, and the 
hosting in Tokyo of the International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to 
Afghanistan on 21-22 January 2002.58 Japan at the conference pledged up to US$500 million 
for rebuilding the government and physical infrastructure of the country, and the conference 
itself raised a total of US$4.5 billion. 
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Explaining the speed of Japan’s response to September 11 
The speed and substance of Japan’s response to the terrorist attacks indicates a number of 
potentially major changes in its security policy which are evaluated in this and the next 
section. The astonishing speed of the GOJ response and passage of the anti-terrorism law 
through the Diet, relative to its past track record in other international and regional crises, can 
be accounted for by a combination of general trends in the policy-making environment 
conducive to security legislation, as well as accumulated experience and skilful leadership in 
the Diet in exploiting this policy environment to the GOJ’s advantage.  
 
The changing role of ‘gaiatsu’ 
In regard to the general environment for policy-making, the initial temptation from all sides 
in Japan and overseas engaged in the debate on Japanese security might be to ascribe the 
rapid passing of the anti-terrorism law and despatch of the SDF simply to the role of gaiatsu 
and a GOJ desire to satisfy US expectations. Earlier sections of this paper have indeed made 
clear that GOJ policy-makers were fearful that their should be no repeat of the ‘Gulf War 
syndrome’ and that Japan should be seen to assist the international community with a human 
contribution—the international community and human contribution instantly synonymous for 
many with the US as Japan’s ally and SDF despatch respectively. Japanese policy-makers 
were certainly vocal in stating that September 11 had posed a ‘final test’ for US-Japan 
cooperation, which, if Japan were to seen to fail, could have cross-over effects for their 
security cooperation in the bilateral context of the US-Japan security treaty and lead to the 
collapse of the alliance. Moreover, GOJ policy-makers and Japanese media were also quick 
to focus on the alleged calls from Under-Secretary of State Armitage for Japan to ‘show the 
flag’, again interpreted in Japan itself as meaning SDF despatch. Hence, there can be no 
doubt that Japan’s policy-makers were aware of the potential importance of gaiatsu from the 
US, and wished to demonstrate that, in terms of President Bush’s categorisation of states as 
either with or against the US in the war on terrorism, Japan was firmly in the US camp.  
 
Nevertheless, although presumed US expectations and the experience of the Gulf War 
certainly exercised the minds of Japanese policy-makers in the design of the anti-terrorism 
law, the connection between the functioning of gaiatsu and Japan’s ‘Hi No Maru gaikō’ was 
arguably functioning in a more complex manner than a decade previously. On the US side, 
the Japan experts in the Bush administration appear to have been far more wily than their 
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predecessors (or even their first incarnation, certain figures having served before in 
government) during the Gulf War. Armitage was careful not to present a public or specific 
list of demands to GOJ officials, and in media interviews given after his original 15 
September meeting with Ambassador Yanai would reveal only that he had expressed the 
hope that Japan would engage as ‘fully as possible’ in the struggle against terrorism, 
including the possibility of logistical support for US forces and the reconstruction of post-
conflict Afghanistan.59 The exact contents of Armitage’s requests for Japanese assistance is 
unlikely to be known over the short to medium. Indeed, there have even been expressed 
skepticism that the US made any requests at all to the GOJ, doubtful that Japan could respond 
effectively at the operational level to make it worth the US’s while, and content instead with 
the provision of bases for the despatch of the Kitty Hawk and maintenance of the supply lines 
from the US Pacific Coast to Okinawa and Diego Garcia  (The disregard for Japan’s 
contribution amongst some sectors of the US government was possibly shown by its 
embarrassing omission from the list of states that had supported the campaign and issued by 
the Department of Defence in late February 2002, and which caused considerable irritation in 
Japanese policy-making circles).60 Armitage, however, aware of the deleterious impact of the 
Gulf War on bilateral relations, may have been wise in not seeking to make a list of demands. 
Instead, the US merely by indicating its hopes for support placed the onus on Japan to 
respond under its own initiative, and thus was possibly able to precipitate a greater Japanese 
contribution than through active gaiatsu and the presentation of a list of demands, which may 
only have worked to undermine the formation any domestic Japanese consensus on the 
necessary response to September 11. Meanwhile, it may have actually been the GOJ side 
which applied the greatest gaiatsu for framing Japan’s response. Studies of Japanese foreign 
policy have demonstrated how gaiatsu generated in and directed from US has often been 
deliberately manipulated by GOJ policy-makers in order to create naiatsu (internal pressure) 
and to realise their agendas.61 In the case of the anti-terrorism bill, though, it looks as if GOJ 
policy-makers not only manipulated gaiatsu for their own purposes, but also deliberately 
generated it themselves. The suspicion is that Yanai may have leaked the contents of his 
meeting and the ‘fly the flag’ expression in order to enhance Japanese expectations of likely 
US demands for support so as to mobilise domestic opinion behind SDF despatch. Similarly, 
Koizumi’s international pledge to despatch the SDF was made in the bilateral context of his 
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meeting with President Bush on 25 September, which effectively nailed the colours of the 
MSDF and Hinomaru flag to the mast of US-Japan cooperation and the need to the need to 
head off anticipated US gaiatsu.62  
 
Public support and the shifting policy structure 
Hence, US-centred gaiatsu, even if in a more sophisticated, indirect, and partly Japan-
generated form, was very much functioning post-September 11, but it also clear that it could 
only prove influential in the domestic debate on security policy because it worked in 
combination with and amplified existing Japanese sentiment which reviled the terrorist 
attacks on the US and advocated a greater role for Japan to contribute to the stability of 
international society. The opinion polls taken in reaction to the debates on September 11 
indicated generally widespread support for the despatch of the SDF to provide logistical 
support for the US and other states.63 In part these polls reflected the public concern for Japan 
to be seen to support its US ally, but also genuine concerns about the new dangers of 
international terrorism, as demonstrated by Japan’s own experience of the Aum Shinrikyō 
sarin gas attacks on the Tokyo subway in 1995, and more widely the shifting sentiment in 
Japan over the past decade towards a more active stance on security.64 As noted later on, the 
persistence of anti-militaristic norms in Japan should not be underestimated, as well as some 
Japanese skepticism over the ways in which the US had created many of the problems of 
September 11 for itself through its own unilateralist foreign policy.65 But at the same time, 
there was undoubtedly a strong public perception in Japan that September 11 was not just a 
US problem but also one for Japan as a member of the international community, and that 
Japan should respond not merely to satisfy the US but also to fulfil its international 
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responsibilities through a human contribution and SDF despatch.66 Hence, the starting point 
for the public debate on Japan’s security contribution in the wake of September 11 differed 
greatly from that of the Gulf War, when the exact need and form of contribution was still the 
subject of intense controversy, and this accounted for the public acceptance and speed of 
passage of the bill in 2001.  
 
In turn, the general public’s willingness to accept SDF despatch was reflective of the general 
shift in the stance of Japanese political parties on security matters within the Diet which also 
served to facilitate the rapid passage of the anti-terrorism law. The major difference in the 
domestic political situation from the time of the Gulf War was obviously the SDPJ’s demise 
as the leading opposition party, and its replacement by the centre-left DPJ much more 
disposed to SDF despatch. But even though, as seen above and in the next section below, the 
LDP was at pains to attempt to enlist the DPJ’s support for, or to neutralise its opposition 
against the anti-terrorism bill, in the end the principal party political check on GOJ measures 
was the governing LDP’s own Kōmeitō coalition partner.  
 
As well as the functioning of gaiastsu, general public support, and the underlying changes in 
the party political structure in Japan, the relative speed and decisiveness of SDF despatch was 
also facilitated by Koizumi’s own popular standing as Prime Minister. Koizumi from March 
to October 2001 was fortunate to enjoy record high approval rating for his Cabinet on 
average of 70 per cent and above. Further easing the despatch of the SDF was the generally 
muted level of opposition in East Asia. China and South Korea urged the utmost Japanese 
caution in seeking to despatch the SDF, but avoided strong or overt criticism. China, in 
particular, seems to have been conscious of its own interests in sanctioning the efforts of the 
US and others to suppress radical Islamic terrorism that could destabilise its western borders, 
and of the need to avoid any repeat of its harsh rhetoric against Japan at the time of the 
revision of the US-Japan Defence Guidelines, which only succeeded in driving Japan further 
into the arms of the US. Hence, on the occasion of Koizumi’s visit Beijing on 8-9 October, 
President Jiang Zemin and Prime Minister Zhu Rongji both urged Japan to exercise 
‘prudence’ in expanding the range of SDF activities, but still acknowledged that it was ‘easy 
to understand’ Japan’s desire to support the US logistically.67 Koizumi was also careful to 
explain Japan’s intentions about SDF despatch in talks with President Kim Dae Jung in Seoul 
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on 15 October. Kim agreed to cooperate with Koizumi to combat terrorism, whilst stressing 
his hopes that SDF despatch would remain ‘within the bounds of the Constitution’.68   
 
Security legislation expertise 
In regard to the actual piloting of the anti-terrorism law through the Diet, this was facilitated 
by the range of experience available to the GOJ in devising security policy legislation. 
Koizumi clearly had at his disposal a comparatively well-organised team to direct GOJ and 
LDP efforts. The establishment of the Cabinet Secretariat since January 2001 as part of the 
GOJ’s administrative reform programme seems to have succeeded in its objective of 
streamlining and improving the coordination amongst the Prime Minister’s advisers and 
ministries in order to respond in a more timely manner to crisis situations.69 The removal of 
three policy offices of Internal Affairs, External Affairs and National Security and their 
replacement with the three Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretaries with no set jurisdictions 
enhanced cooperation, and the incumbents of these offices were clearly possessed with 
considerable policy knowledge. Furukawa as an ex-administrative vice-minister of the 
Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare was one of the best connected bureaucrats in 
Nagatachō and Kasamigaseki, the centres of Japanese politics and bureaucracy. Abe was 
highly experienced in security affairs, and also seems to have felt personally charged—
mindful of his personal background as the grandson of Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, the 
architect of the revision of the US-Japan security treaty in 1960, the process of which 
provoked mass protests and brought about his cabinet’s downfall—to steer Japan towards a 
more active security role, but also to do this in the best prepared manner in order to avoid the 
slips ups of previous LDP administration’s. Abe’s more hawkish sympathies may have 
clashed with the more doveish inclinations of Fukuda, arguably the most powerful figure in 
the Koizumi administration, and especially over the issue of Aegis despatch. Nonetheless, on 
the whole, the close-knit nature of cooperation in the Prime Minister’s office made for 
improved policy coordination amongst the key ministries and the LDP in devising the 
legislation for submitting to the Diet. In the Diet itself, the experience of drafting the 
Guidelines clearly assisted LDP policy-makers, and they employed careful tactics to deal 
with the opposition parties. Yamazaki as a known expert on security affairs performed a 
useful role in drafting the legislation within the LDP using the blueprint of the Guidelines; 
Katō’s appointment as chair of the Diet committee enabled some coordination with the DPJ; 
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and the GOJ was highly wary of allowing Foreign Minister Tanaka to answer opposition 
questions for fear that she would simply implode in debates and undermine the government’s 
carefully prepared legitimisations for the bill. In sum, GOJ policy-makers had created for 
themselves a policy environment and a heightened degree of expertise that enabled them to 
speed the bill through with minimal opposition. 
 
The anti-terrorism law and the future trajectory of Japan’s security policy 
The anti-terrorism law undoubtedly provides a new context for the GOJ to despatch the SDF 
overseas that differs from the US-Japan Guidelines and from the International Peace 
Cooperation Law, and in this context there has also been an undoubted expansion of SDF 
activities in terms of geographical and functional scope. In contrast to the Guidelines, the 
anti-terrorism law, although it designates limitations upon the geographical range of SDF 
logistical operations in support of the US and other states, at the same time provides one form 
of legal framework which expands the SDF’s geographical scope far beyond that laid down 
in the context of the Shūhen Jitaihō. Moreover, the anti-terrorism law also provides for SDF 
missions on the land territory of the states included within its geographical scope, another 
contrast from the Guidelines. Furthermore, the law loosened the restrictions on the use of 
weapons by the SDF to the protection of not only its own personnel but also refugees and 
casualties under its command, again something that the Guidelines and UN PKO Law had not 
allowed for.  
 
The question that has been posed by commentators is whether this GOJ response to 
September 11 and the resulting provisions for SDF despatch under the anti-terrorism law 
heralds the overall future of Japanese security policy. The debate revolves around the issues 
of whether the precedent of SDF despatch could be transferable to other contexts, and 
particularly that of the US-Japan security treaty and Guidelines in dealing with different 
regional contingencies; whether Japan’s actions represent an acceleration of the incremental 
pattern of the expansion of its security role, or, indeed a massive incremental leap in this 
expansion that may open the floodgates to Japan’s breaching of past constitutional 
prohibitions on the exercise of military force independently, bilaterally and multilaterally; 
and whether Japan has now consolidated the shift of the emphasis of its security policy from 
economic to military means.  
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Japan’s steady incrementalism confirmed? 
The despatch of the SDF to the Indian Ocean certainly purveys the image of a radical shift in 
Japanese security policy, but there is also considerable evidence to suggest that it may not 
such a notable departure from past patterns of incrementalism. It is important to point out that 
Japan’s response was provoked by a possibly unique confluence of factors that succeeded in 
pushing policy forward in unprecedented speed and directions, including: the perceived 
magnitude of the September 11 crisis and US expectations for unequivocal support from its 
allies; the general sanction given to international (if not specific US) efforts against terrorism; 
and the extraordinary popularity of Koizumi (a factor which is already declining in strength 
following the dismissal of Foreign Minister Tanaka on 29 March 2002) which promised to 
carry all before it to break potential immobilism in security policy-making.70 In addition, 
GOJ policy-makers, and especially the genrö old-guard of the LDP, continue to adhere to 
traditional constitutional and normative restrictions on the despatch of the SDF, to the point 
of denying the MSDF necessary assets such as Aegis destroyers which could ensure its 
operational; and are careful not to commit Japan to military operations in one context which 
will necessarily lead to their commitment in another. In particular, they retain their usual 
wariness in seeking to avoid entrapment in US military strategy in other regional 
contingencies and resultant alliance dilemmas. Hence, as noted above, GOJ policy-makers 
were ultra-cautious in designing the anti-terrorism law in such a way as to uphold the 
interpretation of Article 9 as prohibiting the exercise of the collective self-defence, and to 
avoid the blatant transgression of elite and public norms of anti-militarism. Similarly, the 
GOJ was keen to stress that the anti-terrorism law and SDF actions in support of the US were 
predicated upon UN resolutions. In this way, the GOJ has been able to retain a degree of 
strategic ambiguity with regard to the actual degree of its commitment in support of its US 
ally. MOFA policy-makers point out that, even though the anti-terrorism law could possibly 
be stretched in interpretation to cover further regional contingencies in the US war on 
terrorism, they would still find themselves able to refuse cooperation in an attack on Iraq if 
the US were unable to produce firm evidence of its regime’s involvement in terrorism and to 
produce a UN resolution in favour of military action—something that looked unlikely given 
the reluctant disposition of the other major powers on the UNSC.71 GOJ actions here were 
very much in line with the past precedent of the Shūhen Jitaihō, which also built in ambiguity 
with regard to Japanese cooperation for the US by emphasising that the scope of the 
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Guidelines was functional and not geographical in nature, and thereby also refusing to rule in 
or out Japan’s military support in regional contingencies such as the Taiwan Straits.72 Finally, 
Japan’s policy-makers also established a brake on future military cooperation in the campaign 
against terrorism with the affixing of a two year limit on the life of the law itself.  
 
Added to this, it is also not case that Japans’s entire attention in devising a response to 
September 11 was devoted to military options to the neglect of past patterns of security 
policy based on economic power.73 MOFA’s interest in dealing with the immediate 
humanitarian problems of the war in Afghanistan, as well as addressing the root causes of 
terrorism related to the economic failings of the Afghan and surrounding states, was 
demonstrated by its provision of aid bilaterally and Tokyo’s hosting of the conference for the 
country’s reconstruction. Japan’s extension of economic assistance clearly complemented the 
US’s overall strategy of seeking to stabilise friendly states around the region of Afghanistan, 
and in this sense was something of a repeat of Japanese assistance provided to Pakistan as a 
‘country bordering on the area of conflict’ to support US Cold War strategy during the Soviet 
Union’s occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s.74 Armitage also expressed his hopes that 
Japan would make a major contribution to Afghan reconstruction through activities such as 
landmine clearance.75 Nonetheless, more than just another US exercise in burden sharing (or 
indeed burden shifting, given initial Bush administration reluctance to engage in ‘nation-
building’ in Afghanistan), Japan’s use of economic power was also clearly in line with its 
own long held articulation of comprehensive notions of security and self-description as a 
civilian power. Japan also attempted to make a distinct diplomatic contribution to addressing 
instability in the Middle East. The fear of many commentators was that Japan’s support for 
the US in the campaign against terrorism would undermine its role as relatively neutral 
interlocutor with the Arab and Gulf States; a position carefully built up since the early 1970s 
and provided to it by its status as the only non-Christian major power. However, during the 
run-up to the Afghan conflict, the Koizumi administration did engage in very energetic 
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diplomacy with the states of the region, and since the collapse of the Taliban and the US 
designation of potentially new targets in its war on terrorism in early 2002, has sought to 
obviate conflict in the Middle East by sending new Foreign Minister Kawaguchi Yoriko to 
Iran in April of the same year.  
 
New horizons for US-Japan security cooperation? 
The above analysis suggests that GOJ policy-makers continue to prefer a cautious and 
incremental approach to the despatch of the SDF, and that there is no guarantee that Japan 
will be prepared to support the US beyond the campaign in Afghanistan. Japan is thus still far 
from becoming the ‘Britain of the Far East’, and those policy-makers and commentators that 
have argued that Japan is moving towards assuming, such a position have misread the 
intentions of its policy-makers. Hence, the future scenarios outlined in 1997 by the (then to 
become and now former) Senior Director  for Asian Affairs of the National Security Council 
(NSC), Torkel Patterson, concerned with Japan increasing its operability with the US for 
operations close to the Persian Gulf and involving Aegis despatch have proved prescient but 
as yet only half realised.76 Nevertheless, it appears that the such current and ex-Japan-
handlers in the Bush administration understand the GOJ stance relatively well, and there is 
only a minor risk of a perception gap between both sides over the degree of support that the 
US can expect from its ally in this context.  
 
Still, it is also arguable that, whilst the Bush administration will be conscious of the 
international and domestic restraints on Japan and will exercise considerable patience, the US 
side will inevitably seek to press its ally to provide ever greater levels of support in the 
context of the campaign against terrorism and in the context of the US-Japan alliance. These 
calls for Japanese support may come to some degree from the Japan experts in the 
administration, but may also come with greater vigour from the other elements of the US 
defence community less appreciative of Japan’s policy-making difficulties. They are derived 
from the fact that both of these strains of policy thought have subscribed since the 
formulation of the ‘Nye-Armitage’ report in October 2002 to the position that Japan should 
indeed be encouraged undertake a greater military security role in cooperation with the US 
based on the model of the UK-US alliance.77 In turn, US opinion has undoubtedly been 
encouraged by the anti-terrorism law which has revealed the extent of the possibilities for 
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Japan to provide support for the US military given sufficient political will. Hence, taking 
their cue from the experience of the anti-terrorism law, and also encouraged by those 
elements in Japan seeking to strengthen the alliance relationship, it appears that the US 
defence community has already begun to seek additional forms of cooperation from Japan. 
For example, in mid-April 2002 at a US-Japan working level meeting on foreign and security 
affairs the US side was believed to have asked Japan to deploy Aegis destroyers and P3-C 
anti-submarine aircraft to the Arabian Sea to substitute for US forces that might be moved to 
the Persian Gulf for an attack on Iraq. Japanese officials reportedly resisted this request as 
they required evidence that US activities would be targeted against al-Qaeda.78 Deputy 
Secretary of Defence Paul Wolfowitz was then reported to have formally requested the 
despatch of these MSDF assets in a meeting on 29 April with the secretary generals of the 
governing coalition parties, including Yamasaki Taku.79 The US request was again, however, 
turned down for the same reasons of Japanese concerns about the exercise of collective self-
defence.  
 
Therefore, it is apparent that Japan, having established the precedent of the expansion of the 
geographical and functional scope of military cooperation with the US in the Afgahn context, 
may find it progressively tougher politically to turn down future requests from the US in the 
campaign against terrorism in other theatres. In turn, the GOJ of Japan may also find it 
politically hard to sustain the US-Japan alliance whilst simultaneously placing different, and, 
possibly seen from the US perspective, artificial restrictions on the support that it can provide 
to the US in the Afghan conflict under the anti-terrorism law and a regional contingency 
under the Shūhen Jitaihō. If another regional crisis were to occur in East Asia, the inevitable 
reaction of US and GOJ policy-makers, the latter’s inherent caution not withstanding, might 
be to overtly transfer the principles and expertise acquired in drafting the anti-terrorism bill to 
the bilateral context of the US-Japan alliance and the Shūhen Jitaihō. In this instance, the 
geographical range of the US-Japan Guidelines for Defence Cooperation could be greatly, or 
even expanded limitlessly if the situation demands; the SDF might be able to operate in 
support of the US on land; and its use of weapons loosened for the protection of its own 
members and US servicemen ‘under its control’—all measures sure to generate intense 
controversy, if not apprehension, amongst regional neighbours. 
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Conclusion: prospects for individual, bilateral and multilateral Japanese security policy 
 
Japan’s support for the US and international community in the campaign against terrorism 
has indeed produced mixed signals about the future direction of its security policy. This paper 
concurs with the views of many Japanese and foreign observers that Japan’s support in the 
context of the Afghan conflict need not necessarily lead to the GOJ seeking to commit the 
SDF to further anti-terrorist actions in support of the US, especially in a scenario involving 
Iraq. September 11 represented a possibly unique confluence of policy-makers factors in 
favour of rapid SDF despatch; GOJ policy-makers continue to adhere to varying degrees to 
constitutional and normative restrictions on Japan’s exercise of military force in the service 
of its security policy, and to retain the option not to provide Japanese support to the US in an 
expanded anti-terrorism campaign or in the bilateral context of the US-Japan alliance; and 
Japan has contributed in many important ways as a civilian power to the reconstruction of 
Afghanistan.  
 
However, whilst GOJ policy-makers may be able to hold this traditional incrementalist line 
over the short term, this paper has also sought to argue that this position may decline in 
relevance over the medium and longer terms. The evidence from the speed and substance of 
Japan’s reaction to September 11 suggests that important and potentially radical trends have 
been set in train in its military security policy. As noted above, over the medium term, the 
principal trend in Japanese security policy may be for enhanced US and Japanese pressure for 
the transfer of the provisions of the anti-terrorism law to the Shūhen Jitaihō. But the 
strengthening of bilateral security ties in the form of the US-Japan alliance is just one of the 
trends that may occur in Japanese security policy as a result of September 11. For it is clear, 
that whatever the exact outcome of Japan’s actions over the short and medium terms for the 
US-Japan alliance, over the longer term the principal effect of participation in the campaign 
against terrorism has been to indicate to and create for its policy-makers a freer environment 
than ever before to shape security policy in not just the bilateral but also the individual and 
multilateral domains.  
 
The shifting policy structure and military security 
Events post-September 11 clearly indicated the fact that the political environment has become 
increasingly conducive to those policy-makers desiring an expanded Japanese role in military 
security. The security agenda for the governing and principal opposition parties in the Diet 
has shifted firmly to acceptance of the necessity of a human contribution to international 
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crises in the form of SDF despatch. The policy-making structure amongst government and 
bureaucratic actors also appears to be shifting decisively to strengthen the military component 
of Japanese security policy. MOFA, the traditional designer of Japanese security policy and 
guardian of civilian control in delimiting the input of the military, scored a number of 
successes in the anti-terrorism bill. It managed to retain a major role in overseeing policy, to 
ensure that Japan was seen to line up closely alongside the US, to secure a provision for the 
deployment of the SDF on land, and to argue for the deployment of economic as well as 
military power; and all this despite its partial incapacitation due to internal financial scandals 
and the sidelining of the Foreign Minister Tanaka. Nonetheless, it also clear that its influence 
has diminished relative to the rise of the JDA, which has come to equalise its role in 
designing security policy since the institution in September 1996 of the more balanced 
formula for the US-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) (the so-called Two-plus-
Two) which includes the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs and Director General of the 
JDA alongside their US counterparts.80 The process of the revision of the Guidelines further 
enhanced this JDA role, which was then consolidated with its significant input into the anti-
terrorism law. The JDA since 2002 appears to have been emboldened by this experience, and 
for the first time inserted into its draft Defence of Japan white paper the assertion that it 
desired to be upgraded to full ministerial status.81 In addition, both MOFA and the JDA are 
now capable of being superseded by and taking directions from the Prime Minister’s Office, 
provided that the incumbent of the office has sufficient public and political party support. 
Hence, Japan is now moving towards a policy-making structure that is not only capable of 
producing speedier decisions, but is also weighted more towards the military aspects of 
security policy. There can be doubt that the ‘normalisers’ have now gained the upper hand in 
designing Japanese security policy.  
 
Collective security realised 
The influence of the ‘normalisers’, and indeed the arch-normaliser himself, Ozawa Ichirō, is 
also evident in the enhanced legal environment for despatch of the SDF. This article has 
demonstrated that in the design of the anti-terrorism law, GOJ policy-maker were cautious to 
avoid breaching in de jure terms the constitutional prohibition on the exercise of collective 
self defence. In de facto terms, however, many policy-makers admit privately that Japan was 
involved in supporting the US to fight a war and Japan’s measures despite legal hair-splitting 
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were, in all but name, acts of collective self-defence. Even more importantly, the circuitous 
route that GOJ policy-makers took to avoid open accusations of collective self defence whilst 
providing support for the US may actually prove in the end to be the path towards the 
exercise of a form of de jure collective self defence. The GOJ, in adopting a policy of 
virtually endorsing collective security to legitimise the anti-terrorism law, has in effect in 
sidestepped Article 9 of the constitution and is now placing the emphasis on the Preamble. 
Article 9 could be read as no longer providing a guide for what Japan should do to contribute 
to international security and how it should do it, but merely as how it should do it in terms of 
restrictions on the use of force, whilst the legitimisation for what Japan should do is now 
provided by the Preamble. This interpretation based on the Preamble is nearly identical to the 
concept of ‘collective security’, first proposed by Ozawa Ichirō in the aftermath of the Gulf 
War and in the LDP Special Study Group on Japan’s Role in International Society, which 
was meant to free up the restrictions on SDF despatch in support of the international 
community under the auspices of the UN.82 Hence, even though Ozawa has become a hate 
figure for the remnants of the SDPJ and many of his ex-colleagues in the LDP, the influence 
of his ideas continues to live on in Japanese security policy-making. The concept of 
collective security, which has come to near realisation in the anti-terrorism law, now offers 
GOJ policy-makers the potential ability to interpret the Constitution in a variety of ways to 
provide the legitimisation for SDF despatch. In this sense, September 11 has certainly 
brought about a greater latent or potential incremental leap in Japanese security policy than at 
the time of Gulf War or in the process of the redefinition of the US-Japan alliance, and GOJ 
policy-makers could, if charged with sufficient political will, stretch the Constitution, if not 
to breaking point, then at least to the point of allowing for de facto collective self defence in 
certain situations.   
 
The final consequences of the shifting political and legal environments for security policy-
making in Japan are still uncertain over the longer term, but it may be possible to divine the 
impact in certain aspects of individual, bilateral and multilateral policy. Japan’s individual 
security policy and defence capabilities have been galvanised to some extent by the 
experience of September 11. The environment engendered by the anti-terrorism bill certainly 
added political momentum for the passing in December 2001 of revised legislation governing 
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the use of force by the JCG in intercepting ships in Japanese territorial waters. The revision 
of this law was designed to prevent the incursions of so-called North Korean ‘spy ships’ 
(fushinsen) and had been slated since the first high-clash between the SDF, JCG and two of 
these ships in March 1999. Although these incursions are probably largely routine, the belief 
of the GOJ is that they may be engaged in espionage and terrorist activities. Hence, post-
September 11 provided the appropriate atmosphere for policy-makers to steer the revised 
laws through the Diet, receiving even the support of the JCP and SDPJ. Japan moved to 
further strengthen its intelligence and anti-espionage capabilities after September 11, the LDP 
sending a team to London on 9 January 2002 to exchange information with UK counterparts; 
and the GOJ also began the process of preparing three bills to submit to the Diet designed  to 
enable Japan to respond to armed attacks. This emergency legislation had been under 
research since 1978. However, the GOJ did not feel assured of the military necessity or 
public support for the legislation until after September 11, and eventually submitted the bills 
to the Diet in April 2002.  
 
In addition to pushing forward the debate on Japan’s individual defence capabilities, the 
policy-making environment generated by September 11 has inevitably encouraged further 
bilateral cooperation in the US-Japan alliance context since 2001. Indeed, domestic critics of 
the emergency legislation view it as less designed to defend Japan itself, and more to enable 
the SDF to provide a more secure platform for the US to project power from Japan to respond 
to regional contingencies. Nonetheless, even more intriguing is the impact of September 11 
on the multilateral aspects of Japan’s security policy, and in particular its engagement in UN 
operations. Japan’s multilateral security role in the UN or regionally has traditionally taken 
second place to activities in support of its own security via its individual defence capabilities 
or the US-Japan alliance. September 11, though, could produce interesting advances in 
Japan’s participation in PKO. The immediate effect of September 11 was to generate policy 
momentum for the unfreezing of limitations placed on SDF activities under the original 1992 
International Peace Cooperation Law (monitoring ceasefires, disarming local forces, 
patrolling demilitarized zones, inspecting the transport of weapons, and collecting and 
disposing of abandoned weapons) and the use of weapons to bring this in line with the 
measures of the anti-terrorism law. These revisions were designed to enable SDF despatch to 
possible PKO operations such as landmine clearance in Afghanistan, and the revisions to the 
law passed the Diet on December 7 2001. Japan’s participation in PKO still remains limited 
relative to other states, but the experience of September 11 has clearly pushed forward both 
its bilateral and multilateral security efforts and these may well expand even further in the 
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future. For even though Japan’s participation in the campaign against terrorism has 
demonstrated that it remains closely tied to the a US-led vision of international security, the 
potential adoption by its security policy-makers of collective security has opened the way 
also to closer cooperation with the UN, so realising Ozawa’s vision of security once again 
and providing a possible counterbalance to the influence of the US.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
